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Target Corporation experienced an information security breach resulting in 
compromising customers’ financial information. Management is responsible for 
implementing adequate information security policies that protect corporate data and 
minimize financial losses. The purpose of this experimental study was to examine the 
effect of a fear appeal communication on an individual’s information security policy 
behavioral intention. The sample population involved information technology 
professionals randomly selected from the SurveyMonkey audience. A research model, 
developed using constructs from deterrence theory and protection motivation theory, 
became the structural model used for partial least squares-structural equation modeling 
(PLS-SEM) analysis of the survey response data, which indicated that self-efficacy was 
statistically significant. The remaining model variables, perceived threat vulnerability, 
perceived threat severity, response efficacy, informal sanction certainty, informal 
sanction severity, formal sanction certainty, and formal sanction severity, were not 
statistically significant. A statistically significant self-efficacy result could indicate 
confidence among the population to comply with information security policies. The 
nonsignificant results could indicate the fear appeal treatment did not motivate a change 
in behavior or information security policy awareness bias was introduced by selecting 
information technology professionals. Social change in information security could be 
achieved by developing an effective information security policy compliance fear appeal 
communication, which could change information security compliance behavior and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Deploying information security has become a necessity for organizations 
implementing information technology. Ensuring employees follow information security 
policies is a challenge for management. The purpose of this study was to examine the 
effect of an individual’s perspectives on information security policy compliance 
behavioral intention. Individuals received a survey, and responses to their perspectives 
and behaviors were statistically analyzed. The results of the study could be useful to 
management responsible for implementing information security. Reliance on information 
technology to support public infrastructure is increasing. An improvement in information 
security compliance could be achieved by examining information technology 
professionals’ perceptions regarding information security policies. Improved information 
security compliance could encourage positive social change in information security and 
contribute to securing the public’s information technology infrastructure. 
In Chapter 1, I present background information regarding the development of a 
study designed to examine information security compliance behavioral intention. This 
chapter also includes a statement of the problem, the purpose of the study, research 
questions, hypotheses, and theoretical foundation. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion on the nature of the study definition, assumptions, scope, delimitation, 
limitations, and the significance of the research study. 
Background of the Study 
Information security has become an increasing concern for management 
(Padayachee, 2012). Researchers who have examined information security have focused 
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on the technical aspects of information security (Crossler et al., 2013). Technical aspects 
of information security are the hardware and software measures integrated into an 
organization’s information system infrastructure. Standard information security measures 
include firewalls, antivirus software, data backup, access controls, encryption, and 
continuous monitoring (Ifinedo, 2012). Ifinedo (2012) found that organizations 
incorporating both technical and nontechnical information security measures are more 
successful at protecting their information assets. Management should implement a 
multifaceted approach to information asset protection to achieve an improved level of 
information security (Ifinedo, 2012). Management should incorporate individual and 
organizational issues in addition to information security technology implementation 
(Ifinedo, 2014). Because of the need to address nontechnical information security 
measures, researchers have incorporated sociology, psychology, and organizational 
behavior approaches into their information security studies (Chu & Chau, 2014). 
Improving information security policy compliance is one method that could improve 
information asset protection. When users do not comply with information security 
policies, implemented information security measures lose their effectiveness (Puhakainen 
& Siponen, 2010). Information security policies are those guidelines, requirements, and 
rules established by management to direct the behaviors of their employees (Ifinedo, 
2014). Crossler et al. (2013) identified areas of information security behavioral research 
to be examined in future research. Future research topics should consider 
 deviant behavior versus misbehavior of insiders; 
 revealing the world of the hacker; 
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 information security compliance improvement; and 
 information security across cultures. 
Because of the importance of information security compliance behaviors, researchers 
have examined behavioral intention by adapting theories from sociology and psychology 
as theoretical foundations. 
 Protection motivation theory originated in the field of psychology, and 
researchers have adapted this theory to information security compliance behavioral 
research (Kim, Yang, & Park, 2014). The basis of protection motivation theory is when 
an individual confronts a threat in which the result is a response (Anderson & Argawal, 
2010). This threat is a fear appeal and contains information communicating the severity 
and possibility of a threat along with a recommended response. Once a fear appeal is 
received, a cognitive mediating process begins, and an individual appraises the threat and 
the recommended response. At the conclusion of the appraisal process, the individual 
takes action because the level of fear has motivated him or her or he or she takes no 
action because there is no perception of a threat (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). Because 
a fear appeal could motivate an individual to take action, researchers in information 
technology behavior frequently use protection motivation theory as a theoretical 
foundation for their studies. 
 Vance, Siponen, and Pahnila (2012) used protection motivation theory to examine 
information security compliance among Finnish municipal employees. Ifinedo (2012) 
integrated the constructs of protection motivation theory and the theory of planned 
behavior to examine information security policy compliance behavioral intention in 
4 
 
Canadian noninformation system managers. Siponen, Mahmood, and Pahnila (2014) also 
used protection motivation theory in a study of information security policy behavioral 
intention. Siponen et al. expanded protection motivation theory by including constructs 
from the theory of reasoned action and cognitive evaluation theory. Protection motivation 
theory served as the basis for all of these studies, but each developed a unique research 
model. There were other opinions on the application of protection motivation theory was 
inadequate for the study of information security compliance behavioral intention.  
Johnston, Warkentin, and Siponen (2015) contended that the results of studies 
using protection motivation theory as a theoretical foundation were inconsistent. Johnston 
et al. developed a new research model merging deterrence theory with protection 
motivation theory to examine information security compliance behavioral intention. The 
merged theories were intended to address the inadequacies regarding protection 
motivation theory. Deterrence theory is a theoretical view based in criminology, and 
according to the theory, people make reasoned decisions (D’Arcy & Herath, 2011). 
Before committing a crime, an individual performs a cost-benefit analysis. If the risk of 
getting caught is high and the punishment is severe, an individual will not commit the 
crime (Siponen & Vance, 2010). Because an individual is less likely to commit an 
unwanted behavior when the probability of getting caught is high and the punishment is 
severe, researchers examining information security policy compliance have used 
deterrence theory as a theoretical foundation (Son, 2011).  
Siponen and Vance (2010) combined the constructs of neutralization theory and 
deterrence theory to create a research model to examine information security policy 
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violations. Son (2011) focused on the constructs of deterrence theory for a research 
model examining information security policy compliance behavioral intention. Cheng, Li, 
Li, Holm, and Zhai (2013) conducted a study examining information security policy 
violation behavioral intention using deterrence theory and social bond theory.  
Although there have been some studies on information security compliance 
behavioral intention using protection motivation theory and deterrence theory 
individually or combined with other behavioral theory constructs, there is a gap in the 
knowledge regarding the merging of protection motivation theory and deterrence theory 
to examine information security policy compliance behavioral intention. Johnston et al. 
(2015) merged protection motivation theory and deterrence theory in the literature, but 
examined password, USB, and data theft. The population for the Johnston et al. study was 
Finnish government employees. To address this gap in knowledge, I conducted a study 
examining information security policy compliance behavioral intention of individuals 
located in the United States using protection motivation theory and deterrence theory. 
This study is needed to increase information asset security through the improvement of 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Problem Statement 
An information security breach at Target resulted in compromised customer 
information and is expected to cost in excess of $1 billion (Stanwick & Stanwick, 2014). 
Information security policy compliance is crucial to information security success (Furnell 
& Rajendran, 2012). Management’s general problem is the inability to implement 
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adequate information security, which results in compromised data and financial losses 
(Posey, Roberts, Lowry, & Hightower, 2014). 
Implementing information security using only a technical approach is insufficient 
(Ifinedo, 2012). Information security policy compliance is a nontechnical security method 
(Vance et al., 2012). Chu and Chau (2014) examined behavioral intentions to understand 
how perceptions affect information security compliance. There is a gap in the literature 
related to studies of information security policy compliance behavioral intention merging 
protection motivation theory and deterrence theory. The behavior of information 
technology professionals that results in noncompliance with information security policy 
resulting in inadequate information security leads to data compromise 
Energy, transportation, communication, and civil protection infrastructure 
supporting society is increasingly dependent on information technology (Piggin, 2014). 
Inadequate information security puts this infrastructure at risk. An examination of 
behavioral intention to comply with information security policies by information 
technology professionals could result in information security compliance and could 
encourage positive social change in information security and contribute to securing 
society’s information technology infrastructure. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the quantitative, experimental study was to examine the 
relationship between information security policy compliance behavioral intention and the 
merged constructs from protection motivation theory and deterrence theory. The 
constructs from protection motivation theory and deterrence theory (perceived threat 
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vulnerability, perceived threat severity, response efficacy, self-efficacy, informal sanction 
certainty, informal sanction severity, formal sanction certainty, and formal sanction 
severity) were the independent variables. Information security policy compliance 
behavioral intention was the dependent variable. Information technology professionals in 
intermediate and entry level positions were randomly selected from the SurveyMonkey 
audience. Control and intervening variables were not applicable to the study because the 
focus was on the relationship between the independent and dependent variables.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Siponen et al. (2014) identified protection motivation theory as “the leading 
theory in the area of health behavior motivation” (p. 218). Constructs from protection 
motivation theory were included in the research model to examine information security 
compliance behavioral intention. Siponen et al. hypothesized that perceived threat 
vulnerability, perceived threat severity, response efficacy, and self-efficacy would 
influence information security policy compliance behavioral intention. Johnston et al. 
(2015) recognized that protection motivation theory served as the theoretical foundation 
in information security compliance research, but the results were mixed. Constructs from 
protection motivation theory were merged with constructs from deterrence theory to 
address the inconsistent results. The research model included the protection motivation 
theory constructs perceived threat vulnerability, perceived threat severity, response 
efficacy, and self-efficacy. Deterrence theory constructs, informal sanction certainty, 
informal sanction severity, formal sanction certainty, formal sanction severity, and 
sanction celerity were also included in the research model examining information 
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security policy compliance behavioral intention. The research model developed by 
Johnston et al. served as the basis for the development of the research model for this 
dissertation. One of the deterrence theory constructs, sanction celerity, was excluded 
from the dissertation research model. Johnston et al. argued that sanction celerity was 
more relevant to animal behavior and voiced concerns about its relevance. Johnston et al. 
indicated that sanction celerity was not a significant influence on information security 
compliance behavioral intention. Due to the Johnston et al.’s concern about the relevance 
of sanction celerity and the nonsignificant results, the construct sanction celerity was 
omitted from the dissertation research model. These factors led to the development of the 
following research questions: 
RQ1–What is the effect of informal sanction certainty on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral? 
H01: Informal sanction certainty will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha1: Informal sanction certainty will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ2–What is the effect of informal sanction severity on an individual’s 
behavioral intention to comply with information security policies? 
H02: Informal sanction severity will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha 2: Informal sanction severity will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
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RQ3–What is the effect of formal sanction certainty on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H03: Formal sanction certainty will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha3: Formal sanction certainty will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ4–What is the effect of formal sanction severity on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H04: Formal sanction severity will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha4: Formal sanction severity will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ5–What is the effect of perceived threat vulnerability on an individual’s 
behavioral intention to comply with information security policies? 
H05: Perceived threat vulnerability will have a nonpositive affect on an 
individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha5: Perceived threat vulnerability will have a statistically significant positive 
affect on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ6–What is the effect of perceived threat severity on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H06: Perceived threat severity will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
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Ha6: Perceived threat severity will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ7–What is the effect of response efficacy on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H07: Response efficacy will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha7: Response efficacy will have a statistically significant positive affect on an 
individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ8–What is the effect of self-efficacy on an individual’s behavioral intention to 
comply with information security policies? 
H08: Self-efficacy will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s information 
security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha8: Self-efficacy will have a statistically significant positive affect on an 
individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Theoretical Foundation 
Scholars who have examined information security behavior have incorporated 
theories from criminology and psychology (Vance et al., 2012). Neutralization theory and 
deterrence theory from the study of criminology have been used to examine information 
security policy compliance (Siponen & Vance, 2010). Researchers used theories from the 
field of psychology to study information security behaviors. Meso, Ding, and Zu (2013) 
developed a research model based on protection motivation theory to examine how 
course lecture knowledge and hands-on project experience affect student information 
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security behavioral intention. Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, and Benbast (2010) examined 
information security compliance behavior using a research model based on the theory of 
planned behavior.  
Researchers have also expanded the theoretical foundations used in information 
security behavior studies by combining theories. Ifinedo (2012) combined protection 
motivation theory and the theory of planned behavior to examine information security 
compliance behavior. Yoon and Kim (2013) combined protection motivation theory and 
the theory of planned behavior to examine information security behavioral intention. 
Siponen and Vance (2010) researched information security policy violations using a 
theoretical foundation combining neutralization theory and deterrence theory. Johnston et 
al. (2015) identified deficiencies and inconsistent results in prior research using 
protection motivation theory. To address these issues, Johnston et al. extended protection 
motivation theory by integrating the constructs of deterrence theory to examine 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. The Johnston et al. 
theoretical foundation served as the basis for the research model developed for this 
dissertation. As the Johnston et al. study was the only one identified during a search of 
the literature combining protection motivation theory and deterrence theory, each theory 
will be introduced separately. 
Protection Motivation Theory 
Rogers (1975) proposed protection motivation theory in the seminal research on 
how a fear appeal can change attitudes. A fear appeal is a persuasive communication 
intended to modify a behavior (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). Witte (1992) identified two 
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components in a fear appeal. The first part contains information regarding the severity of 
a threat and the chance of the threat occurring. A recommendation is included in the 
second part and provides an action to avoid the threat and the value of performing the 
recommended action. Rogers (1983) expanded on protection motivation theory to define 
the perceptions associated with the cognitive mediating processes initiated by the fear 
appeal. Once the information regarding a threat is received, a cognitive mediating process 
begins an appraisal process that will produce positive or negative responses. There is a 
threat appraisal process and a coping appraisal process. Within the threat appraisal 
process are the constructs perceived threat vulnerability, perceived threat severity, and 
rewards. Constructs in the coping appraisal process include response efficacy, self-
efficacy, and response cost. Each construct is hypothesized to either positively or 
negatively affect an individual’s behavioral intention. Perceived threat vulnerability, 
perceived threat severity, response efficacy, and self-efficacy were hypothesized to have 
a positive effect. Reward and response cost were hypothesized to have a negative effect 
(Vance et al., 2012).  
Deterrence Theory 
According to deterrence theory, before committing a crime, a person will perform 
a cost-benefit analysis. If the individual believes the risk of getting caught is high and the 
associated punishment if caught is equally high, there is less motivation to commit the 
violation (Johnston et al., 2015). Onwudiwe, Odo, and Onyeozili (2004) found the 
constructs of deterrence theory in the works of Hobbes, Beccaria, and Bentham. There 
are three constructs included in deterrence theory: perceived severity, perceived certainty, 
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and perceived celerity. When an individual perceives the punishment for an activity to be 
severe, committing an undesirable act is a less likely possibility. If a person perceives a 
punishment for an undesirable act is certain, an individual is less likely to commit an 
undesirable action. A swift punishment will also reduce the possibility of committing an 
undesirable action. Siponen and Vance (2010) hypothesized that within an organization 
there could be external and internal punishments and personal shame associated with an 
information security policy violation. Each of these could have a negative effect on 
information security policy violations.  
Researchers examining information security behaviors used protection motivation 
theory and deterrence theory as theoretical foundations. Anderson and Agarwal (2010) 
found several information security behavior studies that included protection motivation 
theory as a theoretical foundation. D’Arcy and Devaraj (2012) identified that the 
deterrence theory constructs, perceived sanction severity and perceived sanction 
certainty, were frequently used in information security behavior research. Because the 
focus of this dissertation was on an examination of information security compliance 
behavioral intention, using a quantitative research methodology combining protection 
motivation theory and deterrence theory assisted in answering the research questions. 
Chapter 2 includes a more detailed examination of protection motivation theory and 
deterrence theory.  
Nature of the Study 
Much of the literature on investigating information security behaviors used a 
nonexperimental, correlational research design. Posey et al. (2014) identified a need to 
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examine the difference between groups as opposed to additional protection motivation 
theory relationship validation. Johnston et al. (2015) conducted a study of information 
security compliance behaviors using the mixed-methods research. The quantitative 
portion of the research included a posttest-only control group experimental design. Study 
participants were assigned randomly to either the experimental or control groups. 
Participants in the experimental group received an experimental treatment and a posttest 
survey. The control group only received a posttest survey and did not receive the 
treatment. A two group research design allowed for an additional level of statistical 
analysis. Any change between groups can be attributed to the information provided in the 
treatment.  
Key study variables for the dissertation study were those constructs from 
protection motivation theory and deterrence theory. These theoretical constructs were the 
research model independent variables. Independent variables from protection motivation 
theory were perceived threat vulnerability, perceived threat severity, response efficacy, 
and self-efficacy. Deterrence theory independent variables were formal sanction 
certainty, formal sanction severity, informal sanction certainty, and informal sanction 
severity. Information security compliance behavioral intention was the dependent 
variable. Because the focus of the dissertation research was on the independent and 
dependent variables, no mediating or covariate variables are included. 
Each variable was examined individually. An examination of the interaction of 
variables was beyond the scope of this study. Each variable was measured using a 5-point 
Likert scale. Questions related to protection motivation theory used a Likert-type level of 
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agreement scale and included the following responses 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 
3=neither agree or disagree, 4=agree, and 5=strongly agree (Vagias, 2006). For 
questions related to deterrence theory, a level of probability scale was used and included 
the responses 1=not probable, 2=somewhat improbable, 3=neutral, 4=somewhat 
probable, and 5=very probable (Vagias, 2006). 
Johnston et al. (2015) used the mixed-methods research to examine information 
security behaviors, and the quantitative portion of the study included a posttest-only 
control group research design. Singleton and Straits (2010) identified the posttest-only 
control group design as “the simplest of the true experimental designs” (p. 239). All of 
the necessary elements for an experimental design, random assignment of participants to 
the experimental and control groups, the introduction of an experimental treatment, and a 
posttreatment survey, are included in the research design. Because additional information 
regarding the experimental treatment can be obtained, I only used a posttest-only control 
group experimental design. Using a true experimental design requires the random 
selection of participants. Individuals self-reporting their job function as information 
technology and their job level as intermediate or entry level professionals, over the age of 
18, and located in the United States were selected from the SurveyMonkey audience. 
Individuals participating in the study were asked if they had received information security 
policy training. Participants for this dissertation were randomly selected from the 
SurveyMonkey audience population and randomly assigned to either the experimental 
group or control group. SurveyMonkey performed the random selection process and 
forwarded an e-mail to each participant with a link to the survey. After the survey had 
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been completed, response and demographic data were downloaded from the 
SurveyMonkey website. Descriptive statistical analysis was performed on the data. A 
partial least squares-structural equation model analysis was conducted to validate the 
research model and perform hypotheses analysis. 
Definition of Terms 
Appeal to higher loyalties: The belief the only method of protection is by 
complying with information security policies (Kim et al., 2014). 
Behavioral intention: “[A] judgment call about how an individual will behave 
toward complying with information security policies” (Siponen et al., 2015, p. 219). 
Condemnation of the condemners: The amount an individual places the blame for 
an information security policy violation on those judging the action (Kim et al., 2014). 
Defense of the necessity: The belief that there is no guilt associated with an 
information security policy violation because it was unavoidable (Kim et al., 2014). 
Defense of ubiquity: The belief an information security policy violation is 
acceptable because everyone violates the policy (Kim et al., 2014). 
Denial of injury: The amount an individual denies an information security policy 
violation causes any harm (Kim et al., 2014). 
Denial of responsibility: The amount an individual denies responsibility for an 
information security policy compliance violation (Kim et al., 2014). 
Denial of the victim: The belief that the victim deserves the outcome of an 
information security policy violation (Siponen & Vance, 2010). 
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Formal sanction certainty: A perception that organizational punishment will be 
imposed (Johnston et al., 2015). 
Formal sanction severity: A perception that organizational punishment will be 
harsh (Johnston et al., 2015). 
Informal sanction certainty: A perception that punishment from friends and peers 
will be imposed (Johnston et al., 2015). 
Informal sanction severity: A perception that punishment from friends and peers 
will be harsh (Johnston et al., 2015). 
Metaphor of the ledger: The belief an information security policy violation would 
be excused because of previous good behavior (Kim et al., 2014). 
Perceived threat severity: “[T]he severity of the consequences of the event” 
(Meso et al., 2013, p. 53). 
Perceived threat vulnerability: “[A]n individual's assessment of the probability of 
threatening events” (Meso et al., 2013, p. 53). 
Response costs: “[T]he costs associated with the recommended behavior” (Meso 
et al., 2013, p. 53). 
Response efficacy: “[T]he effectiveness of the recommended behavior in 
removing or preventing possible harm” (Meso et al., 2013, p. 53). 
Reward: A method used to encourage information security policy compliance 
(Padayachee, 2012, p. 677). 
Self-efficacy: “[T]he belief that one can successfully enact the recommended 
behavior” (Meso et al., 2013, p. 53). 
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Sanction celerity: A perception that punishment will be quick (Johnston et al., 
2015). 
Assumptions 
For this study, certain assumptions about the cognitive mediating process 
associated with a fear appeal communication were made. I assumed that the fear appeal 
communication was sufficient to motivate a change in the participant. It was also 
assumed that the responses provided by the participant reflected his or her actual 
perceptions to the survey questions and statements. The accuracy of the participants’ 
demographic information used to select the sample and their willingness to complete the 
survey was also assumed.  
Scope and Delimitations 
For this study, the population was information technology professionals in 
intermediate or entry-level position professionals who are over the age of 18 located in 
the United States and who were members of the SurveyMonkey audience. Study 
participants were asked if they had received information security policy training. These 
demographics served as the parameters provided to SurveyMonkey to select study 
participants. SurveyMonkey recruits individuals to become SurveyMonkey audience 
members willing to participate in responding to surveys. With more than 45 million 
members, the SurveyMonkey audience offers a diverse population to academic 
researchers (SurveyMonkey Audience for Academics, 2016). Individuals who were not 
SurveyMonkey members were excluded from the study. SurveyMonkey performs the 
participant sample selection based on the provided demographics. Because participant 
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selection was from the SurveyMonkey audience and not the general population, 
generalization is limited. A random sample was selected from the population to increase 
the ability to generalize the results. 
Various other behavioral theories have been used in whole or in part for 
information security compliance studies. The theory of reasoned action, the theory of 
planned behavior, neutralization theory, social bond theory, and cognitive evaluation 
theory were not considered and were excluded from the study. 
A delimitation of the study is related to the availability of literature supporting the 
theoretical foundation. After a review of the literature, only a single study was found that 
included a combination of protection motivation theory and deterrence theory as a 
theoretical foundation. Because of a lack of similar literature, the formulation of the 
research model relied on multiple information security studies using protection 
motivation theory as the theoretical foundation. These studies were combined with 
information security compliance studies using deterrence theory to develop a research 
model used to examine information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Limitations 
A limitation of the study was the reliance on respondents’ self-reported responses 
to the survey. Although obtaining actual measures of behavioral intention could be an 
improvement, obtaining these actual measures could not be possible. The study sample 
was selected based on the demographic information provided by the SurveyMonkey 
audience member. Because the demographic information provided to SurveyMonkey by 
the member was not verifiable, determining the accuracy of the demographic data was 
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not possible. The introduction of bias was possible by using the SurveyMonkey audience. 
Because SurveyMonkey audience members were familiar with the use of information 
technology required for online survey participation, this increased information 
technology awareness may introduce bias. Individuals regularly using information 
technology may have additional information security policy awareness that the general 
population does not possess. 
Significance of the Study 
This research may fill a gap in the literature regarding management’s 
understanding of information security policy behavioral intention by integrating 
deterrence theory and protection motivation theory to examine behavioral intention to 
comply with information security policy. The results of this study could provide 
contributions to the theories on behavioral intention and practical applications that can be 
used by an organization’s management to address the problem of information security 
policy noncompliance. There is a growing threat to the United States’s critical cyber 
infrastructure from cybercriminals (Shackelford, Proia, Martell, & Craig, 2015). The 
results of the study could add to the body of knowledge on the problem of information 
security noncompliance. Examining the behavioral intention to comply with information 
security policies by information technology professionals could result in improved 
information security compliance and could foster positive social change in information 
security and contribute to securing the nation’s cyber infrastructure. 
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Significance to Theory 
Rogers’s (1975) seminal work on fear appeals and proposing protection 
motivation theory identified a limitation to the theory. Because the proposed theory did 
not include all possible elements affecting attitude change, there may be other variables 
that affect attitude change. Rogers acknowledged that protection motivation theory 
possesses a limited number of elements used to explain model variance and other 
variables may determine attitude change. Rogers suggested the development of a 
comprehensive theoretical foundation through “theory building and empirical research” 
(p. 110). 
Rogers’s (1975) suggestion of elaborating on protection motivation theory by 
conducting research and developing a new theoretical foundation has served as 
motivation for subsequent research. Studies on information security compliance using 
protection motivation theory have expanded the theoretical foundation by integrating 
additional constructs. Lee (2011) included the constructs of moral obligation and social 
influence with protection motivation theory to examine antiplagiarism software adoption. 
Ifinedo (2012) combined the constructs from the theory of planned behavior with 
protection motivation theory to examine information security policy compliance 
behavioral intention. Johnston et al. (2015) combined deterrence theory and protection 
motivation theory to develop an enhanced fear appeal theoretical framework. The 
theoretical foundation developed by Johnston et al. served as the theoretical foundation 
for this dissertation. 
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This study will advance theory by refining the Johnston et al.’s (2015) theoretical 
model, selecting a different population, and selecting information security policy 
compliance behavioral intention as the dependent variable. Research on the effect of a 
fear appeal on information security compliance behavioral intention was limited to the 
research conducted by Johnston et al. Contributions to advancing the theory are possible 
through validating the theoretical foundation, determining the ability of the theoretical 
foundation to be generalized, and building on prior research through refinement of the 
research model. 
Significance to Practice 
Information security management confronts daily threats to information assets, 
information system infrastructure, and personal computers (Johnston & Warkentin, 
2010). Because organizations have become reliant on information technology, 
management must deploy both technical and nontechnical information security measures 
(Ifinedo, 2012). Over half of the information security breaches are the result of 
employees not complying with information security policy. Management has become 
concerned about the criticality of information security policy compliance by employees 
(Vance et al., 2012).  
Implications for practice contribution made by this dissertation include improving 
information security policy compliance, understanding how perceptions influence 
information security policy compliance, and development of effective communications to 
enhance the information security environment. Ifinedo (2012) noted the importance of 
self-efficacy and response efficacy to information security policy compliance. 
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Management can use the information in this dissertation to determine employee self-
efficacy and response efficacy and develop the knowledge and skills necessary to protect 
the information assets. Management can also use the dissertation survey technique of 
surveying two groups and providing an information security communication to only one 
group. Comparing two groups could give management the ability to determine the 
effectiveness of an information security communication before distributing the 
communication through the entire organization. 
Significance to Social Change 
Society has become reliant on information technology for providing critical 
services. Transportation, civil infrastructure, power delivery, and medical treatment all 
rely on information technology. Organizations responsible for operating these technology 
infrastructures are also responsible for their protection. These organizations are 
responsible to society for the safe and reliable delivery of the services provided by these 
infrastructures. The public has become more aware of the information security risks 
associated with an industrial control system with the release of information regarding the 
Stuxnet malware (Piggin, 2014). Positive social change can be achieved through 
increasing the information security policy compliance of employees responsible for 
operating the information technology controlling society’s critical infrastructure. A 
majority of the information security breaches occur as the result of information security 
policy noncompliance (Vance et al., 2012). Compliance with information security policy 
will improve organizational information asset protection. Improved information security 
policy compliance could promote positive social change in information technology 
24 
 
security and contribute to securing society’s critical information technology 
infrastructure. 
Summary and Transition 
Because of noncompliance with information security policy, the problem of 
inadequate information security is an issue for management. I conducted a study to 
examine individuals’ perceptions and their influence on behavioral intention to fill a gap 
in the knowledge regarding information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
I used a theoretical foundation combining the constructs of protection motivation and 
deterrence theory to examine information security policy behavioral intention. In much of 
the literature reviewed, researchers conducted nonexperimental studies to examine 
information security compliance. A posttest-only control group research design was used 
to expand on the research design used in prior studies. Many of the security breaches 
organizations experience are the result of insufficient information security policy 
compliance. An organization can achieve information asset protection improvement 
through information security compliance. 
Chapter 2 is a review of the literature regarding the topic of information security 
compliance and associated theories. Because the theories used to study information 
security compliance come from the fields of criminology and psychology, seminal work 
on the development of protection motivation theory and deterrence theory is discussed. A 
discussion of studies using various theoretical foundations to examine information 
security policy behavioral intention follows an introduction to the theories. The review 
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concludes with an examination of literature regarding using a survey service provider to 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
A single information security breach at Target resulted in 40 million customers 
having their credit and debit card information compromised and is expected to cost more 
than $1 billion (Stanwick & Stanwick, 2014). Information security risks carry severe 
consequences that include corporate liability, loss of reputation, and monetary loss 
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Acceptance and compliance with an organization’s information 
security policies by employees are crucial to a successful information security 
implementation (Furnell & Rajendran, 2012). The problem of information security policy 
noncompliance was analyzed through an approach combining protection motivation 
theory and deterrence theory to investigate behavioral intention. The purpose of this 
study was to examine behavioral intention to comply with information security policy. To 
better understand how behaviors affect information security compliance, research was 
conducted examining behavioral effects (Chu & Chau, 2014; Humaidi & Balakrishnan, 
2015; Kim et al., 2014; Safa, Von Solms, & Furnell, 2016; Shropshire, Warkentin, & 
Sharma, 2015). 
Because protection motivation theory and deterrence theory served as the 
theoretical foundation, current literature on both theories are discussed. Literature on the 
genesis of protection motivation theory and deterrence theory will start the literature 
review. Following the seminal study discussion are summaries of research studies on 
information security compliance using protection motivation theory as the theoretical 
foundation. Protection motivation theory study summaries are followed by additional 
studies using deterrence theory to examine information security policy behavioral 
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intention. I will demonstrate how researchers have used constructs from these theories to 
develop research models used to examine information security compliance behavior. 
Neutralization theory and the theory of planned behavior have also been used in studies 
to examine information security compliance and are discussed to provide a complete 
view of the current literature. Concluding the literature review is a review of the literature 
related to survey service providers. Because I used a survey process provider, a review of 
research studies using a survey service provider is presented. 
Literature Search Strategy 
 I obtained literature for this review from databases in the Walden University 
Library and Google Scholar. Stockton University library was also used to obtain books 
and copies of printed articles. The search did not include individual databases in the 
Walden University Library. Searches were performed using Thoreau to search multiple 
databases. All searches were limited to peer-reviewed scholarly journals. The scope of 
the initial literature search included the years 2006 to 2016 to gain a broader perspective. 
As the search continued, the search was limited to include the years 2010 to 2016. Initial 
search terms included information security compliance, information security behavior, 
and information security policy compliance. After reviewing the initial set of literature, 
the search was expanded to include search terms related to theories used in these studies 
and included protection motivation theory, deterrence theory, the theory of planned 
behavior, the theory of reasoned action, and neutralization theory. To further narrow the 
search criteria, the theory terms protection motivation theory, deterrence theory, the 
theory of planned behavior, the theory of reasoned action, and neutralization theory were 
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combined with topic terms information security compliance, information security 
behavior, and information security policy compliance in pairs. Searches were performed 
using one theory and one topic term. As the research study review progressed, the search 
scope was expanded to gather seminal research on protection motivation theory. Because 
deterrence theory was also used in criminology studies, the terms deterrence theory and 
criminology were included in the search to identify seminal work. Peer-reviewed articles 
were used to obtain literature on information security behavior studies and their 
associated theoretical foundations. A final search was performed using the term 
SurveyMonkey to identify research studies using the SurveyMonkey survey service. A 
combination of peer-reviewed articles and websites were used to gather literature related 
to SurveyMonkey.  
Theoretical Foundation 
 Organizations relying on information systems to store valuable information 
implement information security measures to protect their information assets. Frequently 
these measures include technical information security measures that may include 
firewalls and antivirus software. Although technical information security measures 
provide a certain level of protection, management should include nontechnical security 
measures in their information security portfolio. One example of a nontechnical 
information security measure is an information security policy. Information security 
policy can influence an individual’s behavior (Ifinedo, 2012). Scholars examining these 
behaviors have used theories from social psychology and criminology. Vance et al. 
(2012) suggested the use of the sociocognitive protection motivation theory as a 
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theoretical foundation for examining information security policy compliance behavior. 
Johnston et al. (2015) disagreed and found protection motivation theory as inadequate 
and suggested an enhanced research model incorporating constructs from deterrence 
theory into a protection motivation theory research model. The theoretical foundation for 
the quantitative dissertation study incorporated constructs from protection motivation 
theory and deterrence theory.  
Seminal Work 
Rogers (1975) examined the effect of fear appeals ability to change attitudes and 
proposed protection motivation theory. A fear appeal is a persuasive communication that 
invokes a fear arousal response to eliminate actions that could produce an adverse result 
or take an action that would prevent a harmful event. The contents of the communication 
describe an unfavorable event that will occur if the receiver fails to implement the 
recommendation included in the communication. Communications with a high level of 
fear arousal are more persuasive than those with a low level of fear arousal. The level of 
fear arousal is dependent on the value the recipient attaches to the communication, the 
seriousness of the event, the perceived vulnerability, avoidance importance, and event 
apprehension. 
 Protection motivation theorists established a set of variables related to a fear 
appeal and those actions taken to implement the provided recommendation. Variables 
associated with a fear appeal include the degree of harm, occurrence probability, and 
value of the recommendation. Each of the fear appeal variables will produce an 
associated thoughtful response. The degree of harm will cause the individual to determine 
30 
 
the severity of the fear appeal. An analysis of the occurrence probability will result in 
determining the expected exposure to harm. A determination of the value of the 
recommendation will produce a perception regarding the efficacy of the coping response. 
After developing the thoughtful response to the fear appeal, an attitude change may 
occur. This attitude change is the protection motivation that affects the individual’s 
intention to implement the recommended response (Rogers, 1975). 
 The origins of deterrence theory can be found in “the works of classical 
philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes (1588-1678), Ceasare Beccaria (1738-1794), and 
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)” (Onwudiwe et al., 2004, p. 2). Hobbes (1651/1904) did 
not define men as either good or bad. Instead, they were viewed as individuals with their 
feelings who will want things and will fight to obtain them. People are interested in their 
self-interest that will result in conflict without a governing authority. Because people are 
rational, the pursuit of self-interest would result in crime and conflict (Onwudiwe et al., 
2004). This realization would result in the development of a social contract with the 
government to avoid crime and conflict (Onwudiwe et al., 2004). It becomes the 
responsibility of the government to enforce the social contract, but crime will still occur. 
When crimes do occur, the punishment must exceed the benefits associated with 
committing a crime. Punishment acts as a deterrent for violations of the social contract to 
maintain the social contract (Onwudiwe et al., 2004). 
 Beccaria (1764/1819) elaborated on the concept of the social contract and 
challenged the right of the government to punish crimes. Because people are rational, 
committing crimes would not occur if the cost of the punishment exceeds the benefits. 
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Also if the level of punishment exceeded what was necessary to deter crime, crime would 
not be reduced (Onwudiwe et al., 2004). The best method of preventing crime was with 
swift and certain punishment. Beccaria also asserted that laws should be published to 
inform the people of the purpose and intent of the law. 
 Bentham (1780/1907) was concerned about the arbitrary administration of 
punishment and the brutality found in the criminal laws. It is the responsibility of the 
state to encourage happiness through the use of rewards and punishment. The objective of 
laws is to increase happiness through increased pleasure and decreased pain in the 
community. Bentham felt that punishment more than what was necessary to maintain 
deterrence was unjustified. 
 The work of Hobbes, Beccaria, and Bentham resulted in the three components of 
deterrence theory. Any punishment for a crime should have the elements of severity, 
certainty, and celerity (Onwudiwe et al., 2004). Punishment should be severe enough to 
keep a rational person from committing a crime. Punishment should be certain because if 
a person believes punishment will occur, they would be less likely to commit a crime. 
Swift punishment is also necessary to deter crime. When the punishment is administered 
close to the time of a criminal act, there is an increased realization that crime does not 
pay (Onwudiwe et al., 2004). 
 Straub (1990) used deterrence theory as a theoretical foundation for a study 
examining the effect of deterrents on computer misuse. Straub and Nance (1990) 
contended that information technology misuse could be minimized if these activities are 
detected and punished. A reduction in activities regarding information technology abuse 
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is related to the use of information system security deterrents (Straub, 1990). In an 
examination of the prevention of cheating among programming students, Straub, Carlson, 
and Jones (1993) used deterrence theory as a theoretical foundation. These studies led to 
the application of deterrence theory constructs to the study of information systems. 
Siponen et al. (2007) applied the deterrence theory constructs informal sanctions and 
formal sanctions to a study on information system security policy compliance. 
Compliance 
 Organizations both public and private increasingly rely on information 
technology. Protection of these information assets has become a concern and a priority 
for management (Ifinedo, 2014). Information security software methods include virus, 
malware, spam, phishing, and spyware prevention systems. Hardware security 
technology measures include firewalls and intrusion protection systems. Implementing all 
of these measures will not ensure a secure information system (Safa et al., 2016). 
Information system users are frequently identified as a weak link in information security 
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010). These users become an internal threat to information security 
(Ifinedo, 2014). A serious threat to the organization is leaving removable storage 
unattended and the use of unauthorized applications (Chu & Chau, 2014). Prevention of 
breaches in information security caused by users is not probable using only technical 
measures (Wall, Palvia, & Lowry, 2013). Because organizations cannot rely solely on 
technology to provide adequate security, compliance with information security policies 
has increased in importance (Kim et al., 2014). Information security policies typically 
contain management defined principles, requirements, and guidelines. The information 
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contained in these policies include the acceptable use of information assets, violation 
consequences, information security responsibilities, and training opportunities 
(Sommestad, Hallberg, Lundholm, & Bengtsson, 2014). Organizations influence their 
employees’ behaviors through the use of requirements, rules, and guidelines incorporated 
into information security policies. Although an organization may have put information 
security policies into practice, employee adherence is not guaranteed (Ifinedo, 2014).  
 Management has implemented both positive and negative measures to gain 
compliance to improve information security policy compliance among users. Negative 
measures are based in criminology where a system of sanctions and penalties are used to 
prevent information system misuse (Ifinedo, 2014). Positive measures include 
information security policy training and education to persuade an individual to comply 
with information security policies through knowledge and awareness. Continuous 
communication of information security policy reinforces training and improves policy 
compliance (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). Information security policy compliant 
behavior refers to those activities a user performs to ensure information security is 
maintained. These information security activities are defined in the organization’s 
information security policies (Padayachee, 2012). Because user behaviors play a role in 
information security, various behavioral models are used to examine security behaviors. 
 Scholars who have conducted studies on information security policy compliance 
behavior have incorporated various social psychological theories. Bulgurcu et al. (2010) 
suggested that the attitude of the employee is influenced by the benefit and cost of 
compliance, the cost of noncompliance, and information security awareness. The theory 
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of planned behavior and rational choice theory are combined to serve as the theoretical 
foundation for the Bulgurcu et al. study. Attitude, subjective norms, and perceived 
behavioral control are constructs taken from the theory of planned behavior and were 
included in the Bulgurcu et al. study. The rational choice theory was previously applied 
to studies on economic and social behaviors. Based on neo-classical economics, the 
rational choice theory provides insight into the decision-making process when choices are 
offered. Puhakainen and Siponen (2010) created a research model incorporating the 
elaboration likelihood model and universal constructive instructional model to examine 
the effect of training on information security policy compliance. The universal 
constructive instructional model includes a framework for developing information 
security policy compliance training. Complementing the universal constructive 
instructional model, the elaboration likelihood model assists practitioners with how and 
why the training is expected to perform. Wall et al. (2013) suggested control-related 
motivations can explain information security policy compliance behavior. Self-
determination theory was used to study intrinsic motivations influencing behavior 
intention to comply with information security policies. Kim et al. (2014) developed a 
research model merging planned action theory, rational choice theory, neutralization 
theory, and protection motivation theory. Constructs from each of the theories were 
examined to determine both the combined and individual effect on behavioral intention. 
Ifinedo (2014) combined constructs from the theory of planned behavior, social cognitive 
theory, and social bond theory. Elements of the social bond theory were hypothesized to 
influence constructs from the theory of planned behavior in the Ifinedo (2014) study. 
35 
 
Both the constructs from the theory of planned behavior and social cognitive theory 
would affect information security policy compliance behavioral intention. Crossler, Long, 
Loraas, and Trinkle (2014) focused on a single theory for their research model. Self-
efficacy, response efficacy, and threat severity are constructs from protection motivation 
theory and were incorporated into a research model examining information security 
compliance behavioral intention. 
Protection Motivation Theory Studies 
 Rogers (1983) expanded and revised the original protection motivation theory to  
 identify additional sources of information that begin the coping process; 
 include additional cognitive mediating processes; and 
 provide clarification on coping modes. 
Original elements of protection motivation theory remain intact and the fear appeal 
persuasive communication was included as a verbal persuasion source of information. 
 In addition to the original fear appeal identified as a verbal persuasion, Rogers 
(1983) included observational learning as an environmental source of information. 
Observational learning occurs when an individual “sees what happens to others” (Roger, 
1983, p. 167). Interpersonal sources of information include personality variables and any 
previous experience with a similar situation. This previous experience would include a 
learned response from a prior coping activity. Upon receiving any of the sources of 
information, an individual would start the cognitive mediating process. Cognitive 
mediating processes are the central concept of protection motivation theory. 
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 Protection motivation theory cognitive mediating processes include two appraisal 
methods: threat appraisal and coping appraisal. A threat appraisal includes factors related 
to a maladaptive response. These factors either increase or decrease the probability of 
initiating a response. Maladaptive responses are a continuation of the current behavior. 
Intrinsic and extrinsic rewards increase the probability of a maladaptive response, and the 
perceived severity and perceived vulnerability to the source of information decreases the 
probability of a maladaptive response (Rogers, 1983). Contrary to the maladaptive 
response, the adaptive response is the perception the recommended response is effective. 
During the coping appraisal process, an individual evaluates his or her ability to respond 
to the identified threat (Rogers, 1983). Both response efficacy and self-efficacy increase 
the probability of affecting the adaptive response and the cost associated with the 
adaptive response decrease the probability of affecting the adaptive response (Rogers, 
1983). The result of the threat appraisal and coping appraisal process determines the level 
of protection motivation. Although there are different methods to measure protection 
motivation, the best measurement is behavioral intention. When an individual generates a 
sufficient level of motivation, the behavioral intention is to perform the activities 
associated with the coping mode (Rogers, 1983).  
 Rogers (1983) stated that the behavioral intention generated by protection 
motivation would result in an individual taking some action, or no action. If the decision 
is to perform an activity to cope with the threat, the activity could involve a single action, 
repeated single actions, multiple actions, or repeated multiple actions. The purpose of the 
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source of information is to identify the threat and a persuasion to perform an activity. The 
persuasion could also be a form of prevention to prevent an activity. 
 Rogers’ (1983) protection motivation theory model of examining the factors 
affecting the threat appraisal and coping appraisal cognitive processes resulting in a 
protection motivation behavioral intention serve as the basis of the theoretical foundation 
for studies examining information security behavior. These information security behavior 
studies can be categorized into one of three different protection motivation theory model 
use types. The first type of protection motivation theory model uses all of the constructs 
of the Rogers’ model. The second type of theoretical foundation based on protection 
motivation theory is a combination of theory constructs. In this theoretical foundation 
model type, including constructs from other behavioral theories enhance protection 
motivation theory. Finally, the last theoretical foundation type is a reverse of the second 
model type. Here a behavioral theory is enhanced by integrating constructs from 
protection motivation theory. 
Six Theory Constructs 
 Studies conducted by Boss, Galletta, Lowry, Moody, and Polak (2015); Dang-
Pham and Pittayachawan (2015); Posey et al (2014); and Vance et al. (2012) developed 
research models using all six of the protection motivation theory constructs. Although all 
four studies used all of the protection motivation theory constructs, there were no other 
similarities among the studies. There were differences in sources of information, research 
design, and population. 
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Vance et al. (2012) investigated compliance with information security procedures 
through the integration of two socio-cognitive theories. Habit theory was integrated with 
protection motivation theory to explain compliance behavior. In Habit theory, a habit is a 
type of routine behavior. Vance et al. hypothesized the protection motivation theory 
constructs perceived threat vulnerability, perceived threat severity, response efficacy, and 
self-efficacy would positively affect an employee’s behavioral intention to comply with 
information security policy. Protection motivation theory constructs rewards and 
response cost were hypothesized to negatively affect an employee’s behavioral intention 
to comply with information security policy. Vance et al. further hypothesized habit would 
positively affect all of the protection motivation theory constructs. 
 To test the research model, Vance et al. (2012) invited clerical and administrative 
staff of a Finnish municipal organization to complete a web-based survey. A total of 210 
responses to the survey were received and used for data analysis. All survey responses 
were recorded using an 11-point Likert scale. A one-way ANOVA test was used to 
evaluate the hypothesized information security policy behavioral intention. 
 Theoretical model analysis indicated results that differed from the hypotheses. 
Habit’s effect on the protection motivation theory constructs was positive as 
hypothesized and statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level. Perceived threat 
vulnerability did not have a significant effect on information security policy behavioral 
intention. Perceived threat severity, rewards, self-efficacy, and response cost affected 
information security policy behavioral intention as hypothesized. Response efficacy also 
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had a significant effect on information security policy behavioral intention, but the result 
was negative instead of positive as hypothesized (Vance et al., 2012). 
 Posey et al. (2014) examined the perception of information security between 
information security professionals and organizational insiders. Because information 
security is important for most organizations and technical information security methods 
cannot solve behavior problems, understanding user behavior is essential. Posey et al. 
selected protection motivation theory as the theoretical foundation because of its focus on 
understanding behavioral intention. Prior research has examined information security 
adoption behaviors and validated constructs. Posey et al. identified a lack of research 
conducting a thorough comparison of information security understanding between 
information security professionals and organizational insiders.  
 Posey et al. (2014) used a qualitative research method to gather data from study 
participants. Posey et al. recruited participants from different industries and 
organizational positions. Interview questions were derived from protection motivation 
theory and other possible motivators. Posey et al. conducted a total of 33 interviews with 
22 organizational insiders and 11 information security professionals as study participants. 
Each interview lasted approximately 30 minutes. If necessary, follow-up questions were 
asked to gather more information from the participant. All of the interviews were 
recorded and professionally transcribed. Qualitative data analysis was performed using 
the NVivo 8 software program. Common themes within each of the protection motivation 
theory constructs were identified, coded, and counted for each participant group. 
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Thematic frequencies for each unique response were calculated for group comparison 
(Posey et al., 2014). 
 Posey et al. (2014) found both inconsistencies and consistencies between the two 
participant groups. Posey et al. identified a major difference between the groups 
regarding information security protection behavior. This difference could result in 
organizational information security deficiencies. These deficiencies direct management to 
include both technical and behavioral elements into their information security 
environment. 
Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan (2015) identified the increased use of mobile 
devices in a bring your own device (BYOD) environment and the information risk 
associated with these devices. Insecure BYODs pose a risk to the individual user, 
wireless service provider, and other wireless service users. A specific risk identified by 
Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan (2015) was the threat posed by malware. Malware 
infections can originate on social media, e-mail, and videos. Because of the rise in 
malware targeting mobile devices, there is a possibility a nonwork related Internet 
activity can affect work-related activities in a BYOD work environment. Implementation 
of BYOD policies and antimalware software implementation could mitigate malware 
infections. 
Complying with BYOD security policies and the implementation of antimalware 
software rely on the behaviors of the user. Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan (2015) 
conducted a research study focusing on the behavioral intention to implement 
antimalware software. Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan constructed a research model 
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based on protection motivation theory to examine the behavioral intention of university 
students to avoid malware.  
Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan (2015) hypothesized the constructs of protection 
motivation theory would affect behavioral intention to avoid malware on mobile devices. 
A survey of 56 questions was developed to gather data on malware avoidance behavioral 
intention to test these hypotheses. A 6-point Likert scale was used to record responses to 
each question. Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan noted the 6-point Likert scale was used to 
disallow neutral responses. Students from an Australian university were recruited to 
participate in the survey. Surveys were distributed both online and in person. A total of 
252 responses obtained from both survey distribution methods were used for data 
analysis. The data analysis method included four steps beginning with exploratory factor 
analysis, followed by model measurement, structural equation modeling, and ending with 
hypotheses testing. All of the protection motivation theory hypotheses tested significantly 
supported the behavioral intention to avoid malware. The effect of perceived rewards was 
very small, and self-efficacy had a large effect on malware avoidance behavioral 
intention.  
 Boss et al. (2015) identified information security violations as a common problem 
in personal and work surroundings. Information security research has previously 
conducted studies to find methods to motivate protection of information assets. Protection 
motivation theory is frequently used in information security research. Boss et al. 
identified the use of all protection motivation theory constructs in information security 
research as a gap in the literature. To address this gap, Boss et al. developed a research 
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model including the central protection motivation theory constructs and the constructs 
perceived fear and maladaptive rewards. Boss et al. hypothesized the constructs 
perceived threat severity and perceived threat vulnerability would positively affect 
perceived fear. Boss et al. also hypothesized that all of the model constructs would affect 
protection motivation. Maladaptive rewards and response costs would have a negative 
effect while the remaining constructs would have a positive effect. 
 Two fear appeal scenarios were developed to test the research model and 
hypotheses. Each of the fear appeals had a different level of threat severity. Boss et al. 
(2015) used data loss and mitigation with backups for the low severity fear appeal, and a 
virus infection message was used for the high severity fear appeal. To validate the 
effectiveness of the fear appeal, Boss et al. included a control group in the research 
design. Each threat severity research design produced a research design resulting in two 
independent studies. Students enrolled in the MBA program were selected for the low 
severity study. Participants for the high severity study were taken from undergraduate 
psychology students. Questionnaires were provided to the participants and responses to 
the statements were recorded on a 7-point Likert scale. The low severity study used 104 
participant responses, and the high severity study used 327 participant responses for data 
analysis (Boss et al., 2015). Confirmatory factor analysis was used for model validity and 
was supported at the p < .001 level. Composite factor reliability scores exceeded the 
suggested 0.70 level. A comparison of the two severity studies indicated a high fear 
appeal had twice the influence on motivation intention over the low fear appeal. 
Construct influence on behavioral intention was mixed. For the high fear appeal model, 
43 
 
all of the constructs had a significant influence on behavioral intention. Some of the 
constructs in the low fear appeal model had a nonsignificant influence on behavioral 
intention. These constructs included perceived threat severity, response efficacy, and self-
efficacy (Boss et al., 2015). 
  To better understand how researchers are using protection motivation theory to 
examine information security compliance behaviors, a brief review of prior studies is 
discussed. The discussion begins with studies using research models with five protection 
motivation theory constructs. These studies also had a combination of protection 
motivation theory constructs and constructs from other theories. 
Five Theory Constructs 
Research studies using less than the full complement of protection motivation 
theory constructs as a theoretical foundation comprised a majority of the literature 
reviewed. The number of protection motivation theory constructs used in the theoretical 
foundation varied from a high of five to a low of two. Ifinedo (2012); Lee (2011); Meso 
et al. (2013); Yoon, Hwang, and Kim (2012); and others included five protection 
motivation theory constructs. Researchers used protection motivation theory constructs 
either in conjunction with other constructs or no additional constructs. 
 Crossler and Bélanger (2014) develop a unified measure of security to empirically 
test the behavioral intention to implement a collection of information security measures 
using protection motivation theory. The unified measure of security includes multiple 
information security behaviors to identify a complete view of an individual’s security 
posture. Using a unified measure differs from previous research where only the 
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behavioral intention to implement a single information security method was measured. 
Examining an individual information security behavior does not align with the measures 
people must implement to secure their computer and network infrastructure. This 
information security behavior necessitated the development of a unified security practices 
measure that included technical security measures implemented to protect information 
assets and operational security measures involving the daily information security 
activities. Examining behavioral intention is a strength of protection motivation theory. 
 Researchers used protection motivation theory for their theoretical foundation 
because of its usefulness in understanding the information security decision process. The 
outcome of this decision-making process is guided by the threat and coping appraisal 
processes. Within the threat appraisal process is an individual’s perceived threat severity 
and perceived threat vulnerability to the threat. Response efficacy, self-efficacy, and 
response cost are elements of the coping appraisal process and are the remaining research 
model constructs. Crossler and Bélanger (2014) hypothesized that perceived threat 
severity perceived threat vulnerability, response efficacy, and self-efficacy would 
positively influence the unified security practice. Crossler and Bélanger also 
hypothesized response cost would negatively influence unified security practices.  
 Testing of these hypotheses began with the development of a unified security 
practices instrument. Before deployment of the instrument, it was subject to both a pre-
test and pilot test. Once validated, the instrument was placed online, and professionals, 
students, and small business employees received invitations to participate in the study. 
Data from a total of 279 responses were used for data analysis. Data analysis was 
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performed using partial least squares, and the results were used in hypotheses testing. 
Perceived threat severity, perceived threat vulnerability, response efficacy, and self-
efficacy all significantly influenced the unified security practices. Although perceived 
threat vulnerability significantly influenced unified security practices, the result was in 
the opposite direction of the hypothesis. Additionally, response cost did not significantly 
influence unified security practices (Crossler & Bélanger, 2014). 
 Although Crossler and Bélanger (2014) contended the unified security practices 
measure would benefit information security practitioners, it is unclear if a broad measure 
of information security behavior would be beneficial in a normal organization operational 
environment. Because the unified security practice measure is a broad brush, it may not 
measure those items associated with an individual’s activities. Some security measures 
may be completely transparent to the user. Two of the items included in the unified 
security practice were antivirus software and back-ups. In many organizations these 
activities are transparent to the individual user and including these activities in the 
measure would not provide an accurate measure of the user’s security practice. A multi-
activity measure may be beneficial to information security practitioners, but the measure 
would have to be tailored to the information security environment of the organization. 
 Crossler et al. (2014) conducted a seminal study investigating the compliance 
behaviors related to bring your own device (BYOD) policies. Management permitting 
BYODs should understand the risks to information security and privacy associated with 
these devices. Crossler et al. used protection motivation theory as a theoretical foundation 
because of its use in social psychology and information security research. The constructs 
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perceived threat vulnerability, perceived threat severity, response efficacy, self-efficacy, 
and response costs were hypothesized to influence both the intention to comply with 
policies and the actual policy compliance. Including actual policy compliance differs 
from the established use of protection motivation theory that only includes behavioral 
intention. Prior studies conducted by Lee (2011) and Ifinedo (2012) augmented 
protection motivation theory with the inclusion of different behavioral constructs. A 
nonenhanced protection motivation theory served as the theoretical foundation for the 
Crossler et al. (2014) study, and no additional behavioral constructs were incorporated 
into the research model. 
 Testing of the research model and hypotheses began with submitting invitations to 
complete online surveys to two different samples. One sample was used to test policy 
compliance behavioral intention and the other actual policy compliance. Students were 
used for the policy compliance behavioral intention, and white collar workers were used 
for the actual policy compliance group. Survey responses included 250 students and 194 
white collar workers and were analyzed using descriptive statistics and partial least 
squares analysis (Crossler et al., 2014). 
 Demographic descriptive statistics included age, gender, BYOD use experience, 
and work experience. Construct variable means for each of the group's responses were 
also provided. Policy behavioral intention hypotheses were analyzed using partial least 
squares. Results indicated both self-efficacy and response efficacy were positively related 
to behavioral intention. In contrast, the data did not support a relationship between 
perceived threat severity, perceived threat vulnerability, and response cost with 
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behavioral intention. Analysis for actual policy compliance showed support for perceived 
threat severity, self-efficacy, response efficacy, and response cost. Perceived threat 
vulnerability did not have a significant contribution to actual policy compliance (Crossler 
et al., 2014). 
 Several studies used five protection motivation theory constructs expanded by 
incorporating additional behavioral constructs. In some research studies, researchers 
incorporated a single or multiple construct design into the research model. Ifinedo (2012) 
went a step further by combining constructs from protection motivation theory and the 
theory of planned behavior into a single research model. Several of these research studies 
are discussed to understand how researchers incorporated additional constructs into their 
protection motivation theory research models. 
Lee (2011) noted many colleges and universities are trying to deal with Internet 
plagiarism. Adopting honor codes, promoting awareness, strong enforcement policies, 
and antiplagiarism software are some of the methods institutions are enacting. One of the 
issues associated with these measures is the lack of antiplagiarism software adoption. A 
study was conducted to examine the behaviors affecting this decision to investigate the 
issue of antiplagiarism software adoption. Lee selected protection motivation theory 
because of its use investigating factors related to decision making. Lee proposed the 
faculty members would adopt antiplagiarism software when they perceive Internet 
plagiarism as a threat, find the software is an effective tool, and are capable of using the 
software. Lee expanded protection motivation theory for this study by including the 
effect of behavioral constructs moral obligation and social influence on behavioral 
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intention. Actual adoption of the antiplagiarism software is also examined as part of the 
research model. Lee hypothesized the constructs perceived threat severity, perceived 
threat vulnerability, response efficacy, self-efficacy, moral obligation, and social 
influence would positively influence the behavioral intention to adopt the antiplagiarism 
software. Response cost was hypothesized to influence behavioral intention negatively. 
Behavioral intention was also hypothesized to affect actual adoption, and the behavioral 
intention to implement antiplagiarism software would be higher than the actual adoption 
(Lee, 2011).  
 Testing of the model and hypotheses began by recruiting faculty members from 
two universities. Data from 218 survey responses were analyzed using partial least 
squares. Analysis of the data revealed the perceived severity of negative consequences, 
the probability of plagiarism occurring, software benefits, individual adoption capability, 
and implementation cost influenced the decision to adopt the antiplagiarism software. 
Threat appraisals had a strong influence on adoption behavioral intention. With 
knowledge gained from this study, universities could develop programs to increase the 
adoption of antiplagiarism software (Lee, 2011). 
Yoon et al. (2012) examined the information security behaviors of students using 
an extended version of protection motivation theory. Subjective norm, a construct from 
the theory of reasoned action, was incorporated into the research model along with 
constructs from protection motivation theory. Subjective norm is an individual’s action 
that is influenced by friends and peers. Protection motivation theory constructs included 
in the research model were perceived threat vulnerability, perceived threat severity, 
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response efficacy, self-efficacy, and response cost. Yoon et al. hypothesized these 
constructs would influence information security behavioral intention. Also, Yoon et al. 
hypothesized information security behavioral intention and security habits would 
influence actual information security behaviors. Security habits are those routine 
information security actions an individual develops through repeated action. 
 Yoon et al. (2012) surveyed students from a Korean university using an 
instrument recording responses using a 7-point Likert scale. Data gathered from the 202 
completed surveys were analyzed using partial least squares methods. Hypotheses testing 
indicated perceived severity, response efficacy, and self-efficacy were a significant 
positive influence on behavioral intention. Response cost was also significant but was a 
negative influence. Perceived vulnerability and subjective norm were positive influences 
on behavioral intention but were not significant. Lastly, security habit was a significant 
positive influence on information security behaviors. 
Meso et al. (2013) examined information security awareness and behavior of 
students after completing information security courses. Results from a preliminary survey 
indicated a 28% increase in information security attack awareness and 18% increase in 
malware attack awareness. However, the increase students’ information security skill was 
only 8%, and information security behavior improved even less at a 4% increase. These 
results were motivation to conduct a study, using a theoretical foundation, to compare 




 Meso et al. (2013) selected protection motivation theory as the theoretical 
foundation because of its ability to explain the behavioral intention to perform a 
protective activity. Threat appraisal protection motivation theory constructs included in 
the research model were perceived threat severity and perceived threat vulnerability. 
Coping appraisal protection motivation theory constructs response efficacy, self-efficacy 
and response cost were also included in the research model. Meso et al. hypothesized 
lecture knowledge would positively influence perceived threat severity, perceived threat 
vulnerability, response efficacy, and self-efficacy. Hands-on project experience was 
hypothesized to have a positive influence on perceived threat severity, perceived threat 
vulnerability, response efficacy, self-efficacy, and response cost. Perceived threat 
severity, perceived threat vulnerability, response efficacy, and self-efficacy were 
hypothesized to influence behavioral intention positively. Response cost was 
hypothesized to be a negative influence on behavioral intention (Meso et al., 2013).  
 A web-based survey was used to collect data from students taking an introductory 
computer course. Two groups of students were used as study participants. One group had 
only participated in course lectures on information security and the second had attended 
lectures and completed hands-on projects. Data obtained from the surveys was analyzed 
using partial least squares-structural equation modeling. Measurement model assessment 
indicated both reliability and validity as all values exceeded the recommended threshold 
values. Results from the hypotheses analysis were mixed with several of the hypotheses 
not supported by the data. Lecture knowledge hypotheses were marginally supported for 
perceived threat severity and perceived threat vulnerability and not supported for 
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response efficacy and self-efficacy. Hands-on experience hypotheses were supported for 
perceived threat vulnerability, response efficacy, self-efficacy, and response cost and not 
supported for perceived threat severity. Behavioral intention hypotheses perceived 
severity, response efficacy, and self-efficacy were supported, response cost was 
marginally supported, and perceived vulnerability was not supported (Meso et al., 2013).  
Tsai et al. (2016) examined home computer online information security behaviors 
using a protection motivation theory as a theoretical foundation. Although researchers 
have previously examined home computer information security behavior using protection 
motivation theory, additional constructs were included in the research model. In addition 
to the protection motivation theory constructs, prior experience, subjective norms, 
personal responsibility, perceived security support, and habit strength were incorporated 
into the research model. Tsai et al. hypothesized all of the constructs, except response 
cost, would positively predict information security behavioral intention. Tsai et al. 
hypothesized response cost to predict information security behavioral intention 
negatively.  
Tsai et al. (2016) posted a request for 1000 participants on Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk to test the proposed research model. Each participant receved an incentive of 76 
cents at the conclusion of the survey. A total of 988 survey responses was received. Each 
survey item response was scored on a 5-point Likert scale. A hierarchical regression 
analysis was performed to test the hypotheses. Regression analyses were performed on 
three different models. The first model included only the constructs from protection 
motivation theory. In the second iteration of the model analysis, the constructs prior 
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experience, subjective norms, personal responsibility, perceived security support, and 
habit strength were included in the regression analysis. In the final iteration, demographic 
information was added to the regression analysis. Hypotheses tests revealed perceived 
threat severity, perceived threat vulnerability, self-efficacy, and perceived security 
support were not supported by the data. Analysis results of the construct threat severity 
did produce a significant result, but the result was negative and not positive as 
hypothesized. The remaining construct hypotheses prior experience, response efficacy, 
subjective norms, response costs, safety habit, personal responsibility were all supported 
by the data. 
Tsai et al. (2016) took an unusual approach not found in other studies. 
Participants received an incentive of 76 cents after completing the survey. There was no 
discussion if this incentive was communicated to the participants before starting the 
survey. Tsai et al. indicated the institutional review board approved the study. Although 
providing an incentive could introduce some bias in the results, the amount of money 
paid may be small enough to avoid the bias problem. 
 Ifinedo (2012) investigated information security policy compliance with a 
research model combining the constructs from protection motivation theory and the 
theory of planned behavior. The research model includes the threat appraisal constructs 
perceived threat vulnerability and perceived threat severity and the coping appraisal 
constructs response efficacy, response cost, and self-efficacy from protection motivation 
theory. Coping appraisal constructs from the theory of planned behavior in the model 
were self-efficacy, attitude, and subjective norms. One of the constructs, self-efficacy, is 
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a coping appraisal behavior found in both theories. Ifinedo hypothesized each of these 
constructs would influence information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
 Testing of the research model began by collecting data using two different 
approaches. In the first approach, noninformation technology managers from 
InfoCANADA were mailed a cover letter, survey, and a self-addressed, stamped 
envelope. A total of 68 survey responses was received. A second approach used a sample 
taken from Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) members. 
ISACA members were directed to an online version of the same survey. A total of 56 
information technology professionals provided responses. In both cases, participants were 
encouraged to respond with an offer of four $100 gift certificates and a summary of the 
research results (Ifinedo, 2012). 
 Analysis of the data used partial least squares-structural equation modeling. Using 
this analysis provided an assessment of both the measurement and structural model. Of 
the seven hypotheses, only two were unsupported by the data. The protection motivation 
theory constructs perceived threat vulnerability, perceived threat severity, response 
efficacy, and self-efficacy significantly influenced information security policy 
compliance behavioral intention. Although the perceived threat severity relationship to 
information security policy compliance behavior was significant, the influence was 
negative and not positive as hypothesized. Response cost did not significantly influence 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. Both hypotheses related to 
perceived threat severity and response cost were not supported and were rejected. 
Hypotheses regarding perceived threat vulnerability, response efficacy, and self-efficacy 
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were not rejected. The remaining theory of planned behavior constructs, attitude and 
subjective norms, had a significant influence on information security policy compliance 
behavior intention and the associated hypotheses were not rejected. (Ifinedo, 2012). 
 In a similar manner as studies incorporating five protection motivation theory 
constructs, studies incorporating four protection motivation theory constructs create new 
research models by incorporating additional behavioral constructs. A few of these 
research models merge constructs from one or more theories to create a new theoretical 
foundation. Theories used in combination with protection motivation theory include the 
theory of planned behavior, the theory of reasoned action, cognitive evaluation theory, 
and deterrence theory. Some research studies are briefly discussed to develop an 
understanding of how researchers develop new research models by merging different 
behavioral theories. 
Four Theory Constructs 
Researchers including four protection theory constructs eliminated the constructs 
response cost and reward from their research model. Johnston et al. (2015); Johnston and 
Warkentin (2010); Siponen et al. (2014); and Yoon and Kim (2013) created research 
models with four protection motivation theory constructs. Researchers expanded on 
protection motivation theory by including additional constructs from other theories into 
their research models. 
Johnston and Warkentin (2010) examined the effect of fear appeals on an 
individual’s behavioral intention to comply with an information security 
recommendation. A fear appeal is an existing external stimulus or threat either perceived 
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or not perceived by an individual. Communications including a fear appeal induce 
perceptions that a threat exists, indicates the threat severity, and the individual’s threat 
vulnerability. A fear appeals research model was developed to study the effect of a fear 
appeal indicating an information security threat and implementation of a security 
remediation. Constructs from protection motivation theory served as the basis, and a 
social influence construct was added to the model. Social influence was considered a 
direct cause of behavioral intention and would contribute to determining the acceptance 
of a recommended information security remediation. Hypotheses derived from the model 
indicated the protection motivation constructs perceived threat severity and perceived 
threat vulnerability would have a negative influence on response efficacy and self-
efficacy. Response efficacy, self-efficacy, and social influence would have a positive 
effect on behavioral intention. 
 Johnston and Warkentin (2010) developed a research model to test the fear 
appeals model and examine the effect of a fear appeal on implementing an information 
security threat mitigation. Because university faculty, staff, and students are vulnerable to 
spyware, this population was selected for the experiment. A fear appeal treatment 
communicating the severity and individual vulnerability related to spyware and 
recommended security mediation was developed. Participants were randomly selected 
from the population and placed into one of three different groups. The first group served 
as the experimental group and received a pretest survey, given the fear appeal treatment, 
and a posttest survey. Group two served as the control group and did not receive the fear 
appeal treatment. This group was provided both the pretest and posttest surveys. A third 
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group received the fear appeal treatment and a posttest survey to provide some assertion 
of testing internal validity (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). 
 Results from the structural model analysis indicated support for the fear appeals 
model, with one exception. The data analysis did not support the hypothesized negative 
effect of perceived threat vulnerability. This data analysis result had demonstrated an 
inconsistency regarding protection motivation theory. Other researchers have found 
users’ perception to be one of invulnerability and are less likely to be the target of an 
attack (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). Johnston and Warkentin (2010) suggested a fear 
appeal should strongly indicate the probability of a security attack and the negative 
consequences to counter the perception of invulnerability. 
Yoon and Kim (2013) developed a unique research model incorporating 
constructs from different theoretical foundations. Constructs from the theory of reasoned 
action were combined with protection motivation theory to examine information security 
behavioral intentions. Yoon and Kim hypothesized the constructs from protection 
motivation theory perceived threat severity, perceived threat vulnerability, response 
efficacy, and self-efficacy would influence attitude. Constructs moral obligation, 
organizational and subjective norms taken from the theory of reasoned action along with 
attitude were hypothesized to influence information security behavioral intention. 
 Yoon and Kim (2013) collected data from graduate business students employed in 
Korean companies. An e-mail invitation to the web-based survey was distributed to the 
participants. Responses from 162 surveys were used in the data analysis. The analysis 
was performed using partial least squares. Yoon and Kim noted using this approach was 
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well suited for complex models with latent variables and has minimal sample size 
requirements. Hypotheses testing indicated subjective norm, attitude, and moral 
obligation had a significant influence on behavioral intentions. In contrast, subjective 
norm did not have a significant influence on behavioral intentions. Three of the 
protection motivation theory constructs, perceived severity, response efficacy, and self-
efficacy significantly influenced attitude. Perceived vulnerability did not have a 
significant influence on attitude.  
 Siponen et al. (2014) studied information security policy compliance behavior 
using a new research model. Siponen et al. combined the constructs from protection 
motivation theory, the theory of reasoned action, and the cognitive evaluation theory into 
a theoretical foundation. Protection motivation theory constructs perceived threat 
severity, perceived threat vulnerability, response efficacy, and self-efficacy were 
hypothesized to influence behavioral intention to comply with information security 
policies. The theory of reasoned action constructs attitude and normative beliefs were 
hypothesized to influence behavioral intention to comply with information security 
policies. The rewards construct taken from cognitive evaluation theory was also 
hypothesized to influence behavioral intention to comply with information security 
policies. Lastly, Siponen et al. hypothesized that behavioral intention would influence 
actual information security policy compliance. 
 Employees from Finnish companies served as the population for this research 
study. An invitation to complete an online survey was given to 2892 respondents. A total 
of 669 completed responses were analyzed and tested using structural equation modeling. 
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All of the construct variables, except response efficacy and rewards, had a significant 
contribution to the behavioral intention to comply with information security policies. 
Siponen et al. (2014) identified normative beliefs as having a highly significant affect on 
information security policy compliance intention. Response efficacy and rewards did not 
significantly influence the behavioral intention to comply with information security 
policies. Behavioral intention to comply with information security policies had a highly 
significant effect on actual information security policy compliance (Siponen et al., 2014). 
 Johnston et al. (2015) contended the typical fear appeal and protection motivation 
theory framework is deficient when used for information security research. An enhanced 
research framework integrating constructs from protection motivation theory and 
deterrence theory was proposed to address this deficiency. This framework expands on 
the work of Johnston and Warkentin (2010) and incorporates the constructs formal 
sanction certainty, formal sanction severity, informal sanction certainty, informal 
sanction severity, and sanction celerity (Johnston et al., 2015). The new model also 
includes additional protection motivation theory construct relationships not included in 
the Johnston and Warkentin (2010) research model. Johnston et al. suggested formal 
sanctions will have a different effect on compliance intention than informal sanctions. 
 Johnston et al. (2015) used a sequential mixed-methods research design to test the 
newly created research model. The quantitative portion of the research study incorporated 
an experimental and control group posttest-only research design with randomized 
participant selection. Only the experimental group received the fear appeal treatment, and 
both groups received the survey. Interviews with organizational managers were used for 
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the qualitative portion of the research study. Employees of a Finish municipal 
government served as the study population. 
 Data collection began by inviting 2,475 employees to participate in the study. A 
total of 559 employees indicated a willingness to participate and were randomly assigned 
to the experimental and control groups. Participants received an online web-based survey. 
A multi-stage data analysis was performed using structured equation modeling. The first 
stage data analysis included only the control variables. Protection motivation theory 
constructs were added for the second stage data analysis, and deterrence theory constructs 
were added for the third stage data analysis (Johnston et al., 2015). Because of the 
complexity of the model and the number of data analysis stages, only those constructs 
with insignificant results are presented for this discussion. Perceived threat vulnerability 
from protection motivation theory and formal sanction severity, formal sanction certainty, 
and sanction celerity results were not significant.  
Three and Fewer Theory Constructs 
The next set of research studies incorporating protection motivation theory 
constructs included a smaller subset of the constructs. Safa et al. (2015) and Tu, Turel, 
Yuan, and Archer (2015) included three protection motivation theory constructs and 
constructs from other theories for their research model. Menard, Gatlin, and Warkentin 
(2014) used a research model comprised of two protection motivation theory constructs 
and two convenience constructs to examine the behavioral intention to use a cloud-based 
backup. Research studies integrating three or two protection motivation theory constructs 
could be considered hybrid models because these models include an equal number of 
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constructs from protection motivation theory and the second set of theoretical constructs. 
It is unclear if these models should be considered protection motivation theory research 
models because they include only half, or less, of the total protection motivation theory 
constructs. Examples of these equally balanced construct models are presented to 
understand how these model types are used in information security behavior studies. 
 Safa et al. (2015) contended technology alone could not provide a secure 
information system environment. In addition to technology, the human element related to 
information security should be understood. Safa et al. developed a research model and 
included constructs from the theory of planned behavior and protection motivation theory 
to examine the attitude toward having an information security environment. Safa et al. 
hypothesized the protection motivation theory threat appraisal constructs perceived threat 
vulnerability and perceived threat severity would positively affect information security 
behavioral intention. Self-efficacy related to information security activities would also 
have a positive effect on information security behavioral intention. Constructs from the 
theory of planned behavior hypothesized to affect information security behavior included 
in the research model were attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. 
Safa et al. also hypothesized that information security awareness would affect attitude, 
the organizational policy would affect subjective norms, and experience would affect 
perceived behavioral control. Testing of the research model began with collecting data 
from study participants.  
 Safa et al. (2015) developed a survey to measure each construct in the research 
model. The questionnaire included 43 questions and responses were recorded on a 5-
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point Likert scale. Participants for the research study were selected from information 
security and information technology professionals employed in Malaysian companies. At 
the conclusion of the survey process, responses from 212 completed questionnaires were 
statistically analyzed. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to test the variable 
measurements. Structural equation modeling was used to test the research model and 
hypotheses. All hypotheses, except one hypothesis, significantly contributed to the 
information security behavioral intention. Perceived behavioral control did not 
significantly affect information security behavioral intention, and its hypothesis was 
rejected. 
Tu et al. (2015) developed a research model integrating the constructs from 
protection motivation theory and social learning theory to examine coping intentions 
related to the loss or theft of a mobile device. One of the threat appraisal protection 
motivation theory constructs, perceived threat, was hypothesized to influence coping 
intentions positively. Protection motivation theory coping appraisal constructs self-
efficacy and self-efficacy were hypothesized to influence coping intention positively. 
Sources of information used for protection motivation theory constructs were taken from 
social learning theory. Response knowledge was hypothesized to influence self-efficacy 
and response efficacy positively. Threat experience was hypothesized to have a positive 
effect on perceived threat. Social influence was hypothesized to have a positive influence 
on response knowledge, perceived threat, and coping intentions. Tu et al. contended the 
various environmental exposures to information regarding the loss of theft of a mobile 
device is a source of information. Rogers (1983) established these sources of information 
62 
 
as the initiator of the cognitive threat appraisal and coping appraisal processes. Tu et al. 
identified knowledge of information security measures, prior loss of theft experience, and 
social influence as sources of information. 
 To test their hypotheses and research model, Tu et al. (2015) engaged the services 
of a survey company to administer an online survey. A total of 339 completed responses 
were used for data analysis. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to determine model 
fit. Although the model was aligned with the data, the result was not significant. 
Covariance-based structural equation modeling was used to test the hypotheses. The data 
significantly supported all tested hypotheses. The research model explained coping 
intention variance of 59%. 
 Tu et al. (2015) took an unusual approach to the development of their research 
model. In Rogers’ (1983) expanded and revised version of protection motivation theory, 
the threat appraisal process included the constructs perceived threat severity, perceived 
threat vulnerability, and response cost. Tu et al. combined perceived threat severity and 
perceived threat vulnerability into a single construct, perceived threat. Tu et al. 
acknowledged previous research supported the use of perceived threat severity and 
perceived threat vulnerability to examine behavioral intention but provided no 
explanation for the combining of constructs. By combining two constructs into one, some 
level of granularity in the analysis is lost. 
Menard et al. (2014) identified data loss as a threat to data availability. 
Availability is a component of the security triad defined by the protection, integrity, and 
availability of information assets. The use of a cloud-based data backup solution was 
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suggested to mitigate this risk. However, it is unclear if the automatic nature or 
convenience of a backup solution affects the implementation decision. To examine the 
effect of a user’s perception on the behavioral intention to implement a cloud-based data 
backup solution, Menard et al. developed a research model based on protection 
motivation theory and convenience factors. The constructs perceived threat severity and 
perceived threat vulnerability from protection motivation theory were used to examine 
the threat appraisal component of the research model. Menard et al. excluded the 
protection motivation theory constructs response efficacy and self-efficacy because their 
effect would be minimal. Ease of use of the cloud-based data backup was given as the 
reason for their exclusion. Perceived automaticity and perceived concurrency were the 
constructs used to examine the convenience factors. Perceived automaticity is the belief a 
user has about how easy the cloud-based data backup is to use. Perceived concurrency is 
the belief the cloud base data backup will make the data available to all user devices. 
 University students were invited to participate in a research survey to test the 
hypotheses that the four constructs would positively affect a cloud-based data backup 
implementation. A total of 152 responses were used for data analysis. Partial least 
squares-structural equation modeling analysis was used to test the hypotheses. The data 
supported all four hypotheses, but the dependent variable variance explained by the 
model was .091, lower than expected (Menard et al., 2014). 
Theoretical Foundation Expansion 
The final category of research model is the expansion of behavioral theory by 
integrating protection motivation theory constructs. In this example, neutralization theory 
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is expanded by integrating constructs from multiple theories. Kim, Yang, and Park (2014) 
take a unique approach to their development of a research model by integrating 
constructs from four theoretical foundations. Planned action theory, rational choice 
theory, neutralization theory, and protection motivation theory are combined to explain 
the behavioral intention to comply with information security policies. Neutralization 
theory constructs denial of responsibility, denial of injury, condemnation, metaphor of 
ledger, appeal to loyalty, defense of necessity, and defense of ubiquity are hypothesized 
to influence behavioral intention. Rational choice constructs benefit of compliance, cost 
of compliance, and cost of noncompliance are hypothesized to influence an individual’s 
attitude. From planned action theory attitude and subjective norms are hypothesized to 
influence behavioral intention. Lastly, self-efficacy and response efficacy constructs from 
protection motivation theory are hypothesized to influence behavioral intention. 
 Researchers visited randomly selected companies, presented the study’s intentions 
and selected a few individuals from different organizational levels in the company. Each 
participant was provided a survey to gather responses regarding the behavioral intention 
to comply with information security policies. A total of 194 completed surveys were used 
for data analysis. Variable reliability and validity testing were performed using structural 
equation model analysis. Partial least squares analysis was used for reliability, validity, 
and hypotheses testing. Results of the hypotheses testing were mixed with the rejection of 
self-efficacy as an indicator of behavioral intention (Kim et al., 2014). 
 Although the study was described as a combination of four theories, not all of the 
constructs from all four theories were included in the research model. Only two of the 
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protection motivation theory constructs were included in the research model. A key 
element of protection motivation theory is the use of a fear appeal or source of 
information. A source of information was not included as part of the research model. An 
augmented neutralization theory model may be a better description of the theoretical 
foundation. Also, all of the neutralization techniques were combined into one hypothesis 
and not individually tested. 
Sources of Information 
In his seminal work examining fear appeals and developing protection motivation 
theory, Rogers (1975) stated that a persuasive communication containing the fear appeal 
would initiate the cognitive mediating process of evaluating and acting on the 
information in the communication. Rogers (1983) expanded on the fear appeal initiator of 
the cognitive mediating process by defining sources of information that would be the 
initiators of the cognitive mediating process. These sources of information would include 
verbal persuasion, observational learning, personality variables, and prior experience. 
Rogers included a fear appeal as a verbal persuasion. Although a source of information is 
necessary to begin the cognitive mediating process, not all of the research studies found 
in the literature define their sources of information. 
Tu et al. (2015) provide a detailed discussion on sources of information in their 
study of mobile device loss or theft. Some examples of sources of information are 
presented and discussed. These include prior experience, social influence, verbal 
persuasion, and observational learning. Although a source of information is necessary for 
a cognitive mediating process to begin, some researchers use the original fear appeal 
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concept. Johnston and Warkentin (2010) use a fear appeal in their study of information 
security behaviors. A message communicating the effect, probability, and recommended 
remediation of spyware were provided to the survey participants at the start of the survey. 
Boss et al. (2015) expanded the use of fear appeal by developing a high and low fear 
appeal treatment. By having two levels of fear appeal, an analysis of the more effective 
fear appeal is possible. Johnston et al. (2015) incorporated two different fear appeals, one 
regarding password theft and another on USB theft, into their examination of the 
effectiveness of sanctions on behavioral intention. Another common element of these 
studies is their use of an experimental or quasi-experimental research design and the use 
of a control group. 
Most research studies using a nonexperimental correlational research design did 
not specify a source of information as the initiator of the cognitive mediating process. 
Lee (2011); Ifinedo (2012); and Yoon et al. (2012) discuss different possible sources of 
information that would initiate the cognitive mediating process. Other researchers 
identified a specific source of information in their nonexperimental correlational studies. 
Vance et al. (2012) identified habit as the source of information used to initiate the 
cognitive mediating process. Meso et al. (2013) use information security course lectures 
and information security hands on projects as the source of information.  
When conducting a research study using protection motivation theory as the 
theoretical foundation, defining a source of information is important to establishing the 
initiator of the cognitive mediating process. Articles found in the literature using a 
nonexperimental correlation research design seem to place less emphasis on defining the 
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source of information. Those studies using an experimental or quasi-experimental 
research design, defining the source of information is critical. In these studies, the source 
of information becomes the treatment provided to the experimental group. Using two 
groups in a study allows me to test the effectiveness of the treatment used in the study. 
Study Results 
 Research studies found in the literature using protection motivation theory as their 
theoretical foundation incorporated from six to two of the protection motivation theory 
constructs. Because many of the protection motivation theory research models developed 
for these studies are unique, making a direct comparison of the results was difficult. 
Frequently constructs from different theories are incorporated along with protection 
motivation theory to develop a research model. Performing a side by side comparison 
would leave some gaps when one construct is present in one research model but not in the 
other.  
Only protection motivation theory constructs used in the research model will be 
compared to facilitate a comparison of results. Also, studies will be grouped by the 
number of common protection motivation theory constructs used in the research model to 
permit a more direct comparison of results. This technique was also used in the prior 
discussion of study reviews. For this discussion, only the results from studies using six, 
five, or four protection motivation theory constructs will be included in the comparisons. 
Research studies using three or fewer constructs will be removed from the comparison 
because these studies either combine constructs or the protection motivation theory 
constructs are used to enhance another theoretical foundation. 
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Studies conducted by Boss et al. (2015); Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan (2015); 
Posey et al. (2014); and Vance et al. (2012) all included six protection motivation theory 
constructs. Because the Posey et al. (2014) study was qualitative, the study will not be 
included in the results comparison. The hypotheses for the remaining three quantitative 
studies were similar. Perceived threat vulnerability, perceived threat severity, response 
efficacy, and self-efficacy were all hypothesized to have a positive influence on 
behavioral intention. Rewards and response cost were hypothesized to have a negative 
influence on behavioral intention. A comparison of the results was mixed. Perceived 
threat vulnerability was not significant for all three studies. Response cost was significant 
for all studies. For the remaining protection motivation theory constructs, there was no 
agreement on the significance of the results.  
Studies using five of the protection motivation theory constructs included studies 
by Crossler and Bélanger (2014); Crossler et al. (2014); Ifinedo (2012); Lee (2011); 
Meso et al. (2013); Tsai et al. (2016); and Yoon et al. (2012). All of the studies included 
the same protection motivation theory constructs and excluded the construct rewards. 
Hypotheses for all of the constructs were similar for all studies. Perceived threat 
vulnerability, perceived threat severity, response efficacy, and self-efficacy were 
hypothesized to have a positive effect on behavioral intention. Response cost was 
hypothesized to have a negative effect on behavioral intention. Only the response 
efficacy result was significant for all studies. For the remaining studies, the results were 
mixed. Examining the results for a common results trend found self-efficacy to be 
significant for all but one study. Other constructs had mixed significant and 
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nonsignificant results. Siponen et al. (2014) used a research model with five constructs 
but used a different model structure. The construct reward was included in the research 
model, and response cost was excluded. Because the Siponen et al. study was the only 
study using this research model form, it was excluded from the results comparison. 
Johnston and Warkentin (2010); Yoon and Kim (2013); and Johnson et al. (2015) 
used a research model including four protection motivation theory constructs. Both 
rewards and resource costs were excluded from the research model. Johnston and 
Warkentin (2010) developed a unique research model, and two of the constructs were not 
hypothesized to influence behavioral intention and was excluded from the results 
comparison. Studies by Yoon and Kim (2013) and Johnson et al. had similar results. 
Perceived threat vulnerability was not significant for both studies. Perceived threat 
vulnerability, response efficacy, and self-efficacy results were significant for both 
studies. 
Protection Motivation Theory Review 
Protection motivation theory has been widely applied to the problem of 
information security compliance. Research models using constructs from protection 
motivation theory have various formulations. Research models have integrated from six 
to two protection motivation theory constructs. Constructs from multiple theoretical 
foundations have been integrated with protection motivation to create unique theoretical 
foundations. These new theoretical foundations served as the research models used to 
examine information security compliance behavioral intention. Because of the uniqueness 
of the research models, a comparison of results was difficult. Studies were grouped by 
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common constructs to facilitate a comparison of protection motivation theory studies. A 
common grouping permitted a comparison of studies using similar research models. 
Although there were some result commonalities among some studies, the differing results 
can be motivation for additional protection motivation theory studies. 
Deterrence Theory Studies 
 Deterrence theory is based on the premise that before an individual decides to 
commit a crime, a risk-benefit analysis is conducted. If the benefits are greater than the 
risks, then the decision is to commit the crime (Johnston et al., 2015). When deciding to 
commit a crime if the person believes there is a high risk of getting caught, the 
punishment is severe (Siponen & Vance, 2010), and the punishment will be quick the 
motivation to commit the crime is diminished (Johnston et al., 2015). Deterrence theory 
has been applied to information security research because of the relevance of perceived 
sanction severity and perceived sanction certainty (D’Arcy & Devaraj, 2012). Siponen 
and Vance (2010) suggested the detection and punishment of computer violations will 
minimize the occurrence of computer abuse. Because of its relevance to information 
security research, studies examining information security compliance behavioral 
intention have incorporated deterrence theory constructs into their research models. 
 Siponen and Vance (2010) stated information security policy noncompliance is a 
problem for information system managers. Constructs from neutralization theory were 
merged with constructs from deterrence theory to examine the problem of information 
security policy noncompliance. Although prior research examining information security 
policy noncompliance has used deterrence theory as a theoretical foundation, 
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neutralization theory has not been used in these types of studies. Both deterrence theory 
and neutralization theory are taken from the field of criminology. Neutralization theory 
indicates individuals who violate the rules use the excuse an activity did no harm to 
justify their actions. Constructs from neutralization theory include theory defense of 
necessity, appeal to higher loyalties, condemn the condemners, metaphor of the ledger, 
denial of injury, and denial of responsibility were incorporated into the research model. 
Details on neutralization theory are discussed in a separate section of the literature 
review. Siponen and Vance (2010) included the deterrence theory constructs formal 
sanctions, informal sanctions, and shame in their research model. Siponen and Vance 
hypothesized neutralization, a combination of the six neutralization theory constructs, 
would have a positive effect on information security policy violation behavioral intention 
and the three deterrence theory constructs would negatively affect information security 
policy violation behavioral intention. 
 Data collection began with the development of an instrument based on prior 
validated instruments. Responses to the survey items were recorded on an eleven-point 
scale. Participants were selected from a population of organizations in Finland. Surveys 
were distributed to the participants, and 1449 responses were received. Theoretical model 
and hypotheses tests were performed using partial least squares-structural equation 
modeling. Hypotheses tests began with the deterrence theory constructs, and only 
informal sanctions had a significant effect on information security policy violation 
behavioral intention. In the second phase of hypotheses testing, neutralization constructs 
were incorporated and had a significantly strong effect on information security policy 
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violation behavioral intention. However, when the neutralization constructs were added 
to the analysis, the deterrence theory constructs were not significant. 
 Son (2011) identified an organization’s employees as the weakest link in 
information security. Information security policy violations such as not changing a 
password or not logging off a computer put the organization at risk. Because deterrent 
certainty and deterrent severity have been identified as effective methods to prevent 
information asset misuse, deterrence theory was selected as the theoretical foundation to 
examine information security policy compliance behavioral intention. Deterrence theory 
constructs were categorized as either extrinsic or intrinsic motivation models. In the 
extrinsic motivation model are the constructs perceived deterrent certainty and perceived 
deterrent severity. Perceived legitimacy and perceived value congruence are part of the 
intrinsic motivation model. Son (2011) hypothesized all four of the deterrence theory 
constructs would have a positive effect on information security policy compliance 
behavioral intention.  
 To test the research model and hypotheses, Son (2011) used full-time employees 
as the target population. Panel members from a professional data collection company 
were used to gather the study sample. Invitations to participate in the study were sent to 
2000 panel members using e-mail. Included in the e-mail was a link to an online web-
based survey. Responses to the survey were recorded using a 7-point Likert scale. A total 
of 602 completed surveys were used in the study data analysis. Partial least squares-
structural equation modeling was used for data analysis to validate the measurements and 
test research model. Son’s (2011) analysis of the results indicated significant support for 
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the hypotheses related to perceived legitimacy and perceived value congruence. 
However, the hypotheses perceived deterrent certainty and perceived deterrent severity 
did not significantly support information security policy compliance.  
Chen, Ramamurthy, and Wen (2013) identified information security policy 
compliance as a priority for information security management. Management strategies for 
ensuring information security compliance have included both negative and positive 
measures for enforcement. Management supporting a negative strategy suggests 
punishment for information security policy violations. Deterrence theory suggests that an 
increase in punishment and severity will discourage unwanted behaviors. Management 
advocating for a positive strategy use a reward as an incentive for information security 
policy compliance. Organizational theories include a reward as motivation to reinforce 
information security policy compliance positively. Finally, an argument could be made 
that both a reward and punishment could affect the cost-benefit decision an individual 
makes before performing a noncompliance behavior.  
 Chen et al. (2013) identified a gap in the literature examining the effects of two 
information security compliance enforcement strategies. To examine how incorporating 
both a negative and positive enforcement strategy would affect information security 
compliance, a research model incorporating these elements was developed. Chen et al. 
hypothesized punishment for noncompliance would have a positive effect on information 
security compliance, a reward for compliance would have a positive effect on 
information security compliance, and certainty of control would have a positive effect on 
information security compliance. Chen et al. also hypothesized that the certainty of 
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control would moderate the effect of both punishment and reward and reward moderates 
the effect of punishment. Participants were asked to review the policies related to four 
different scenarios and answer a series of questions to test the research model. 
 Chen et al. (2013) recruited employees from two mid-west companies to 
participate in the study. Using a web-based system, participants read each of the four 
information security policy questions and provide responses to the survey questions. 
Responses to the scenarios questions were recorded using a 7-point Likert scale. Several 
control variables were included in the survey. Organizational security culture responses 
were recorded using an 8-point Likert scale. Information security policy and information 
security training questions were recorded using a 4-point Likert scale. Responses related 
to security monitoring questions were scored using a 7-point Likert scale (Chen et al., 
2013). 
 Data analysis began with exploratory factor analysis to test for model validity. 
Testing of the hypotheses used a one-way ANOVA. Because the study also examined the 
interaction of the independent variables, three one-way ANOVA analyses were 
performed. Analysis of the results indicated the severity of punishment, the significance 
of reward, and certainty of control all significantly contributed to information security 
policy compliance. These results also found severity of punishment and certainty of 
punishment acted as a deterrence to information security policy violations (Chen et al., 
2013). 
D’Arcy and Devaraj (2012) acknowledged that employees pose a significant risk 
to information technology security. Because deterrence theory has played an important 
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role in technology misuse research, deterrence theory was selected as the theoretical 
foundation for the study. D’Arcy and Devaraj suggested the deterrence theory constructs 
perceived certainty of sanctions and perceived severity of sanctions, along with informal 
sanctions and employment context would influence an individual’s intention to misuse 
information technology. D’Arcy and Devaraj also investigated the relationship between 
formal and informal sanctions. A two-level research model was used to examine the 
influence of these constructs on intention to misuse information technology. The model is 
composed using three categories of constructs, formal sanction, informal sanctions, and 
employment context. Included in the formal sanctions category are perceived certainty of 
sanctions and perceived severity of sanctions. Social desirability pressure and moral 
beliefs comprise the informal sanctions category. Employment context includes virtual 
status and employment level constructs. A survey was developed and distributed to 
computer users in the United States to test the research model. 
 D’Arcy and Devaraj (2012) selected a sample of participants from a population of 
individuals using computers on a daily basis. Two groups of participants were used in the 
sample. The first group included employees from organizations in the United States and 
the second group was employed individuals participating in an evening MBA program. 
D’Arcy and Devaraj suggested using the employee participants would reduce the possible 
bias in the MBA responses. Invitations were extended to 600 employees, and 228 
completed responses were received. Surveys were distributed in class to 273 MBA 
students and 183 completed responses were received. Responses from the survey were 
analyzed using partial least squares and covariance-based structural equation modeling.  
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 Analysis of the results demonstrated model reliability and the hypotheses all 
indicated a significant influence on intention to misuse information technology. A 
goodness of fit test value of 0.54 exceeded the cutoff value of 0.36. Examining the 
relationship between formal and informal sanctions demonstrated both formal sanctions 
and informal sanctions had a direct and indirect significant effect on intention to misuse 
information technology (D’Arcy & Devaraj, 2012). 
Because culture has an influential effect on attitude and behavior, Hovav and 
D’Arcy (2012) examined information technology misuse behavior between the United 
States and South Korean cultures. An extended version of deterrence theory was used as 
the theoretical foundation for the research study. Deterrence theory was augmented with 
information security countermeasures and cultural constructs. Prior studies found 
information security countermeasures influenced information system misuse behavior. 
These security countermeasures included both procedural and technical countermeasure 
constructs. Cultural constructs included power distance, individualism/collectivism, 
uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation. The deterrence theory construct, moral 
belief, was used as an informal sanction and perceived certainty of sanctions and 
perceived severity of sanctions were used as formal sanctions. Age and gender were used 
as social status constructs. Hovav and D’Arcy (2012) hypothesized procedural and 
technical countermeasures would have a positive influence on moral beliefs, perceived 
certainty of sanctions, and perceived severity of sanctions. Hovav and D’Arcy also 
hypothesized the influence would be greater for individuals from the United States than 
from South Korea. Formal sanctions, informal sanctions, and social status were 
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hypothesized to influence information technology misuse intention, and the effect would 
be greater for individuals from the United States than from South Korea. 
 Two samples were taken from part-time MBA students and company employees. 
One sample was taken from United States organizations and the second from South 
Korean organizations. For the United States sample, 269 completed responses were 
received from employees and 97 completed responses were received from part-time 
MBA students. For the South Korean sample, 145 usable responses were received from 
employees and 215 completed responses were received from MBA students (Hovav & 
D’Arcy, 2012). Hovav and D’Arcy noted the response rates from both countries were 
similar.  
 Hovav and D’Arcy (2012) conducted an analysis of the response data using 
partial least squares-structural equation modeling. Testing model convergent validity 
resulted in a value of 0.7 and exceeded the recommended value of 0.5. A 
multicollinearity test produced a result less than 2.2 for both samples and was below the 
3.0 cutoff value. Hypotheses testing for the United States and South Korean samples 
were performed separately. There were significant statistical differences between 
perceived certainty of sanctions and perceived severity of sanctions between the two 
cultures. The perceived certainty of sanctions was stronger for the South Korean sample, 
and perceived severity of sanctions was stronger for the United States sample. Their 
combined influence on information technology misuse intention was greater for the South 
Korean sample but was not statistically significant. The effect of countermeasures was 
also greater for the South Korean sample but was not statistically significant. Because 
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perceived certainty of sanctions had a greater influence on information technology 
misuse intention with the South Korean sample and perceived severity of sanctions had a 
greater influence on information technology misuse intention with the United States 
sample, Hovav and D’Arcy (2012) contended that deterrence theory is culturally biased. 
Cheng et al. (2013) found that prior research into information security compliance 
behavior failed to include participants from China. A theoretical model incorporating 
social control and deterrence theory was developed to examine the behaviors of Chinese 
employees to address this gap. Because an organization is considered a social group, 
Cheng et al. contended social control constructs apply to an organization. Social control 
in organizations is represented by policies the organization enact to discourage improper 
behaviors. Formal controls from deterrence theory serve to discourage behaviors through 
the use of sanctions. 
 Constructs used to develop the research model fall into either the formal control 
or information control categories. The deterrence theory constructs perceived certainty of 
sanctions and perceived severity of sanctions were included as formal controls. Social 
bond constructs include attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief. Subjective 
norm and co-worker behavior are social pressure constructs and are also informal 
controls (Cheng et al., 2013). Cheng et al. (2013) hypothesized all of the constructs, with 
the exception of co-worker behavior, would have a negative influence on the intention to 
violate information security policy. Co-worker behavior was hypothesized to have a 
positive influence on the intention to violate information security policy. Surveys were 
distributed on paper and through an online web-site to test the research model. Paper 
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surveys were distributed to Chinese employees and 87 completed responses were 
received. Invitations were e-mail through a professional survey website to 300 
employees. A sample of 185 completed online surveys was included with the hard copy 
responses for data analysis.  
 To test both the measurement model and the structural model, Cheng et al. (2013) 
selected partial least squares-structural equation model analysis. Reliability testing scores 
for all constructs exceeded the recommended 0.7 level. Model validity tests exceed the 
0.5 level, and construct correlations were lower than the 0.9 threshold. Structural model 
testing produced a result of 75.2% explanation of the variance related to the intention to 
violate information security policy. Hypotheses analysis indicated perceived severity of 
sanctions, attachment to job, attachment to the organization, commitment, belief, and 
subjective norm had a statistically significant negative relationship with the intention to 
violate information security policy. Co-worker behavior had a statistically significant 
negative relationship with the intention to violate information security policy. These 
results supported seven of the 11 hypotheses. The remaining four hypotheses related to 
perceived certainty of sanctions, attachment to immediate supervisor, attachment to co-
workers, and involvement did not have a statistically significant relationship with the 
intention to violate information security policy. 
Cheng, Li, Zhai, and Smyth (2014) conducted a study to examine the behavioral 
intention of an individual to use the Internet for personal purposes while at work. A 
research model incorporating deterrence theory constructs into neutralization theory was 
developed to examine this behavior. Cheng et al. hypothesized neutralization techniques 
80 
 
would have a positive effect on a person’s behavioral intention to use the Internet for 
personal purposes while at work. These neutralization techniques include denial of 
responsibility, denial of injury, denial of victim, condemnation of condemner’s, and 
appeal to higher loyalties. Deterrence theory constructs perceived severity of sanction and 
perceived certainty of sanction would have a negative influence, and perceived benefits 
will have a positive influence on a person’s behavioral intention to use the Internet for 
personal purposes while at work.  
A sample was selected from an organization’s employees to test this model. These 
organizations also had Internet use policies stating no personal use of the Internet is 
permitted. Participants were invited to participate in the study either by receiving a paper 
survey or an e-mail with a link to the survey. A total of 230 completed surveys were 
received, 118 from the paper survey and 112 from the online survey. Responses to the 
survey were recorded using a 7-point Likert scale (Cheng et al., 2014). 
Cheng et al. (2014) used partial least squares-structural equation modeling to 
analyze the measurement scales and test the hypotheses. Reliability results of the latent 
variables exceeded the 0.7 threshold and construct validity exceeded the 0.5 threshold. 
All construct validities were less than the 0.9 threshold. The model explained 65% of the 
variance of a person's behavioral intention to use the Internet for personal purposes while 
at work. Both neutralization and perceived benefits had a positive effect on a person’s 
behavioral intention to use the Internet for personal purposes while at work. The 
perceived certainty of sanction was negatively related to a person’s behavioral intention 
to use the Internet for personal purposes while at work. Contrary to the original 
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hypothesis, perceived severity of sanction did not have a significant relationship with a 
person’s behavioral intention to use the Internet for personal purposes while at work. 
Results Comparison 
 In a review of the literature regarding the use of deterrence theory to examine 
information system security behavior, D’Arcy and Herath (2011) found “inconsistent and 
sometimes contradictory findings” (p. 656). This inconsistency was also found in the 
results of the studies previously discussed in the literature review. First, there was a lack 
of commonality among the studies regarding deterrence theory constructs used in the 
research model. Constructs of deterrence theory include severity, certainty, and celerity 
of sanction (Onwudiwe et al., 2004). Only the study by Johnston, Warkentin, and 
Siponen (2015) included sanction severity, sanction certainty, and sanction celerity. For 
the remaining studies, research models included the deterrence theory constructs sanction 
severity, sanction certainty, or a construct combining both sanction severity and sanction 
certainty. Siponen and Vance (2010) used the combined deterrence theory construct 
sanction and divided the sanction into formal and informal sanctions. Results of the study 
indicated both constructs did not introduce a statistically significant influence on 
information security policy violation. D'Arcy and Devaraj (2012) used the combined 
deterrence theory construct formal sanction in a study examining information technology 
misuse. The combined construct resulted in formal sanction having a significant influence 
on information technology misuse.; Cheng et al. (2013); Cheng et al. (2014); and Hovav 
and D'Arcy (2012) included perceived sanction certainty and perceived sanction severity 
in their research models examining information security violation. Results were 
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inconsistent with perceived sanction certainty and had a significant effect for Cheng et al. 
(2014) and a nonsignificant effect for Hovav and D'Arcy and Cheng et al. (2013). 
Perceived sanction severity had a significant effect for Hovav and D'Arcy and Cheng et 
al. (2013) and a nonsignificant effect for Cheng et al. (2014). Son (2011) and Johnston, 
Warkentin, and Siponen (2015) hypothesized the deterrent theory constructs would have 
a positive effect on compliance but the manner in which there were used differed between 
the two studies. Son used perceived sanction certainty and perceived sanction severity 
and found them both had a nonsignificant effect on compliance. Johnston et al. divided 
sanction severity and sanction certainty into formal and informal sanctions. Only the 
informal sanctions had a significant result, and formal sanctions had a nonsignificant 
result. The third deterrence theory construct, sanction celerity was also nonsignificant. 
Another issue regarding the results comparison was the formulation of the hypotheses. 
Some studies examined compliance while others examined violations. Studies examining 
violations with deterrence theory constructs would have a negative influence (Siponen & 
Vance, 2010) and hypotheses regarding compliance would have a positive influence 
(Son, 2011). 
Deterrence Theory Review 
Deterrence theory is another behavioral theory used in studies examining 
information security compliance behavioral intention. Because deterrence theory 
originated in the field of criminology, studies reviewed from the literature examine the 
effect of sanctions on information security compliance behavioral intention. Several 
studies were briefly discussed to demonstrate how researchers used deterrence theory as a 
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theoretical foundation. Most of the studies reviewed created a unique research model 
using the constructs from deterrence theory and other behavioral constructs. These 
studies also differed in their hypotheses. Some studies examined the positive effect on 
compliance, others the negative effect on violations. Because of these differences, a 
direct comparison of results was open to interpretation on how to compare construct 
results. A review of the results did indicate mixed outcomes for those studies using the 
same constructs. Mixed results in the studies provide an opportunity for future research 
studies. 
Neutralization Theory 
Neutralization theory is based on the concept that people who obey the law and 
those who break the law “believe in the norms and values of the community in general” 
(Siponen & Vance, 2010, p. 489). When an individual decides to break the law or engage 
in antisocial behavior, using neutralization techniques allows them to perform the action. 
When someone uses neutralization techniques, they dismiss norms by justifying their 
improper behavior. In their seminal work on neutralization theory, Sykes and Matza 
(1957) proposed denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of the victim, 
condemnation of the condemners, and appeal to higher loyalties as neutralization 
techniques. Later neutralization techniques were expanded when Klockars (1974) 
included metaphor of the ledger and Minor (1981) contributed the defense of the 
necessity. 
In their examination of information security policy violations, Siponen and Vance 
(2010) used a combination of neutralization theory and deterrence theory as the study’s 
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theoretical foundation. Six of the neutralization theory techniques denial of responsibility, 
denial of injury, condemnation of the condemners, appeal to higher loyalties, metaphor of 
the ledger, and the defense of the necessity were integrated with deterrence theory 
constructs to create a research model. A research model based on neutralization theory 
was also developed by Kim, Yang, and Park (2014) and included all seven neutralization 
techniques. This research model also included constructs from protection motivation 
theory, rational choice theory, planned action theory, and the theory of planned behavior.  
Results from the Siponen and Vance (2010) study using the neutralization 
techniques indicated all of the constructs were a statistically significant contributor to 
information security policy violation behavioral intention. Additional details of the study 
were previously discussed in the discussion of deterrence theory. Kim et al. (2014) 
combined all of the neutralization techniques into a single construct. Results indicated 
neutralization significantly contributed to information security compliance behavioral 
intention. A prior discussion on protection motivation theory constructs included 
additional study details. 
Theory of Planned Behavior 
 Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) proposed the theory of planned behavior as an 
extension of the theory of reasoned action. Ajzen (1991) suggested the theory of planned 
behavior can forecast an individual’s behavioral intention based on “attitudes toward the 
behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control” (p. 179). Constructs of the 
theory of planned behavior include behavioral beliefs, normative beliefs, and self-
efficacy and are considered “antecedents of attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived 
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behavioral control” (Bulgurcu et al., 2010, p. 527). Because of its theorized ability to 
forecast behavioral intentions, the theory of planned behavior has served as the 
theoretical foundation for studies examining information security compliance behavioral 
intention. 
 Bulgurcu et al. (2010) suggested that the attitude of the employee is influenced by 
the benefit and cost of compliance, the cost of noncompliance, and information security 
awareness. The theory of planned behavior and rational choice theory are combined to 
serve as the theoretical foundation for the study. Attitude, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavioral control are constructs taken from the theory of planned behavior 
and included in the study. Godlove (2012) suggested the lack of information security risk 
awareness by teleworkers makes it difficult for management to maintain the security of 
the organization’s information assets. Godlove proposed a study to examine the 
teleworker’s attitude to information security compliance behavior using the theory of 
planned behavior as the theoretical foundation. Ifinedo (2012) recognized the construct 
self-efficacy overlapped protection motivation theory and the theory of planned behavior 
and combined the two theories to examine information security policy behavioral 
intention. Sommestad, Karlzén, and Hallberg (2015) expanded the theory of planned 
behavior to include constructs from protection motivation theory and anticipated regret. 
Sommestad et al. hypothesized the constructs attitude, perceived norm, and perceived 
behavioral control from the theory of planned behavior combined with the constructs 
perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, response efficacy, self-efficacy, and response 
costs from protection motivation theory and anticipated regret would affect information 
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security policy behavioral intentions. Al-Mukahal and Alshare (2015) developed a 
research model based on deterrence theory, neutralization theory, and the theory of 
planned behavior. Al-Mukahal and Alshare hypothesized that information security policy 
awareness, employee trust, information security policy simplicity, and policy effect on 
work environment would be related to the quantity of information security policy 
violations. 
Survey Service Provider 
 Obtaining a sufficient number of research study participants can be a challenge. 
Some researchers use students from their academic institutions. Boss et al. (2015) 
surveyed MBA and psychology students for a study examining information security 
behaviors. Yoon, Hwang, and Kim (2012) created a study of students examining 
perceptions affecting information security behaviors. Crossler and Bélanger (2014) 
developed an information security practice index and surveyed business students to 
examine behaviors related to information security. A scholar-practitioner conducting 
research without a relationship with an academic institution would have difficulty using 
students as participants. An alternative would be to enlist the services of a survey service 
provider. 
 Using a survey service provider offers researchers another source of research 
participants. Son (2011) obtained participants from a survey company for a research 
study. Tsai et al. (2016) used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to obtain participants for a 
study examining home security behaviors. Bulgurcu et al. (2010) used the services of a 
research company to provide participants for a study examining information security 
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policy compliance. Although a specific survey service provider was not mentioned in the 
literature reviewed, SurveyMonkey offers an online web-based survey service. 
 SurveyMonkey offers a suite of survey services to a wide variety of customers, 
including academic researchers. Symonds (2011) examined the applicability of 
SurveyMonkey to be used as a library assessment tool. Because there was little budget 
available, library staff used SurveyMonkey low-cost services for online surveys. 
Although a formal study was not conducted, the assessment and resource planning team 
found SurveyMonkey to be an adequate question-based assessment tool. 
 Although SurveyMonkey use was not explicitly stated in prior information 
security behavioral research, the SurveyMonkey service has been used in other studies. 
Studies in the medical field have used SurveyMonkey as a service provider. Reitz and 
Anderson (2013) identified the ease of developing a survey using SurveyMonkey and its 
ability to reach a large population for nurse workforce studies. SurveyMonkey was used 
to appraise the effectiveness of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Nurse Faculty 
Scholars program (Hickey et al., 2014). SurveyMonkey has also been used in behavioral 
studies. Wright and Khatri (2015) used SurveyMonkey to recruit 1,078 nurses to 
participate in their study of bullying psychological and behavioral responses. 
Summary and Conclusions 
 Using purely technical measures to implement information security is inadequate. 
Nontechnical measures should be included to ensure a secure information system 
environment. Because nontechnical security measures involve people, researchers have 
conducted studies to examine how an individual’s perceptions can affect information 
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security compliance behavioral intention. Theories from criminology and psychology 
have served as the theoretical foundation for studies examining information security 
compliance. These theories include deterrence theory and neutralization theory from 
criminology and protection motivation theory and the theory of planned behavior from 
psychology. Protection motivation theory and deterrence theory were frequently used in 
the reviewed literature. These two theories will also serve as the theoretical foundation 
for this dissertation. Several studies using protection motivation theory and deterrence 
theory were reviewed to demonstrate how these theories were enhanced and expanded to 
study information security compliance. Studies using neutralization theory and the theory 
of planned behavior were summarized to complete the review of the literature regarding 
information security compliance. Because this dissertation will use SurveyMonkey, a 
brief review of information security compliance studies using a survey service provider 
was provided. An additional discussion on the use of SurveyMonkey in research studies 
provided insight on how a survey service provider was used in research. 
 A generalization of the literature reviewed is a lack of common research models 
among studies examining information security compliance behavioral intention. Using a 
theory as the basis of a theoretical foundation, researchers have developed unique 
research models by combining constructs from one or more theories. The use of unique 
research models poses a problem for a direct comparison of results. Although it is 
possible to compare the results of similar constructs used in multiple studies, it is 
unknown if the other constructs used in the research model influence the main theoretical 
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constructs. Because of these unique research models and a lack of comparative studies, 
researchers have a large amount of material available for use in future research. 
Chapter 3 will describe the experimental study used to examine information 
security policy behavioral intention. A discussion of the research design and study 
methodology will be discussed to provide the steps used to conduct the study. The 
research design discussion is followed by the data analysis plan and the methods used to 
mitigate threats to study validity. Because of the need to protect study participants, the 
chapter concludes with those ethical procedures used to protect the participants and the 
associated research data. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
The purpose of this quantitative, experimental study was to examine the 
relationship of constructs from a combination of protection motivation theory and 
deterrence theory and information security compliance behavioral intention. The 
constructs from protection motivation of perceived threat vulnerability, perceived threat 
severity, response efficacy, and self-efficacy were the first half of the independent 
variables. The second half of the independent variables, informal sanction certainty, 
informal sanction severity, formal sanction certainty, and formal sanction severity, are 
constructs from deterrence theory. The relationship between the independent variables 
and the dependent variable information security policy behavioral intention was 
examined in this dissertation. The participants for this study were individuals indicating 
that their job function is information technology and their job level is intermediate or 
entry-level professionals who are SurveyMonkey audience members. Control and 
intervening variables were not applicable to the study because the focus was on the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research tools and techniques used 
in this dissertation. A description of the research method is provided along with a 
discussion supporting the selected research design method. The study population and 
methods of selecting participants are also provided. Data collected from the participants 
were recorded on an instrument. Details on the data collection method and instrument use 
are described. Methods relevant to the protection of participants and their personally 
identifiable information were implemented during the study. With the data collection 
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process defined, the focus will move to the data analysis methods. The previously 
presented research questions are included with the relevant statistical methods used to 
analyze each variable. Descriptive and inferential statistical methods were used to 
provide an analysis of the data represented by each variable.  
Research Design and Rationale 
A quantitative, experimental, posttest-only control group design was selected as 
the research design for this dissertation. This research design includes two groups: one 
experimental group and one control group. A survey was provided to the experimental 
group after receiving an experimental treatment. When the experimental group receives 
their survey, the control group also receives a survey, but the control group does not 
receive the experimental treatment. In addition to including two groups and an 
experimental treatment, participants must be randomly selected and assigned to one of 
the two groups. See Figure 1 for a diagram of the research design.  
On = observation at time n 
X = experimental treatment 
R = random assignment of participants 
 
   X   O1 Experimental group 
R 
                      O1 Control group   
Figure 1. Research design. 
A similar research design without the random assignment of participants is a quasi-
experimental design (Singleton & Straits, 2010). 
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A version of the posttest-only control group design was used by Johnston and 
Warkentin (2010) in their examination of fear appeals effect on information security 
compliance behavioral intention. A posttest only design was incorporated into the pretest-
posttest control group research design. Singleton and Straits (2010) defined true 
experimental research designs as designs containing two or more groups, and participants 
are randomly selected. Designs incorporating these elements contribute to the 
minimization of internal validity. The posttest-only control group design is a true 
experimental design and includes random assignment of participants and two groups. An 
experimental treatment is introduced to the experimental group before the administration 
of a survey. A control group is the second group, and only the survey is administered to 
the group. Johnston et al. (2015) used a posttest-only control group research design in a 
mixed-method study of information security compliance behavioral intention. 
Participants were randomly selected and assigned to the experimental and control groups. 
Each of the participants in the experimental group received a fear appeal treatment 
followed by the survey. Control group participants did not receive the experimental 
treatment and only received the survey. Johnston and Warkentin (2010) selected this 
design to determine if any changes in the group observation during the posttest were 
related to the experimental treatment and not some external influence. Siponen and 
Vance (2010) encouraged the use of a posttest measure after an information 
communication to examine behavior changes. 
Variables included in the research design included the eight independent variables 
derived from the theoretical foundation and the dependent variable information security 
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Figure 2. Research model. 
Four of the independent variables, perceived threat vulnerability, perceived threat 
severity, response efficacy, and self-efficacy, are constructs from protection motivation 
theory. The remaining four independent variables, formal sanction certainty, formal 
sanction severity, informal sanction certainty, and informal sanction severity, are 
constructs taken from deterrence theory. Because the focus of the research was on the 
independent and dependent variables, no mediating or moderating variables were 




In this section, the methodology developed to conduct the research study is 
discussed. Elements of the methodology include the population, sample determination, 
participant recruitment, survey instrument, and the experimental treatment. 
SurveyMonkey was used as the survey service provider, and many of the aspects related 
to population, sampling, and recruitment were determined by the processes and 
procedures of SurveyMonkey. I determined the study elements that included establishing 
the sampling criteria, instrument development, and providing the experimental treatment. 
Details of each element are described to define the methodology used in the study. 
Population 
The population for this study was information technology professionals in 
intermediate or entry-level position professionals who were over the age of 18 located in 
the United States and were members of the SurveyMonkey audience. Respondent 
members of this population were recruited to participate in SurveyMonkey surveys. 
There are more than 45 million members in the SurveyMonkey audience. SurveyMonkey 
offers a diverse population of respondents to academic researchers. After a member joins 
the SurveyMonkey community, they become a SurveyMonkey contribute member. When 
joining the SurveyMonkey audience, members complete an individual profile and 
provide gender, age, location, and other possible characteristics used to select a survey 
sample. After a SurveyMonkey contribute member completes a survey, a contribution is 
made to a charity selected by the member. Members are also eligible to enter a 
sweepstake (SurveyMonkey Audience for Academics, 2016). 
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Sampling and Sampling Procedures 
A random sample of participants was selected from the SurveyMonkey audience. 
SurveyMonkey performed the random selection of participants. Eligible participants were 
selected by matching the dissertation sample criteria to the profile information provided 
by the SurveyMonkey contribute member. Dissertation sample inclusion criteria included 
individuals self-reporting their job function as information technology and their job level 
as intermediate or entry-level professionals, over the age of 18, and located in the United 
States. This sample criteria were provided to SurveyMonkey for participant selection. 
Siponen and Warkentin (2010) used a random sample for participant group assignment in 
their study of information security policy violation behavioral intention. 
Scholars who have examined information security policy compliance behavioral 
intention indicated that there was no agreement on how to calculate a sample size for 
studies using partial least squares-structural equation modeling data analysis. Most 
researchers invited a large number of individuals to participate in a study and used all of 
the completed survey responses in their data analysis. For these studies, the number of 
completed surveys became the sample size. Urbach and Ahlemann (2010) suggested that 
the sample size should be within the range of 30 to 100 participants. Hair, Sarstedt, 
Pieper, and Ringle (2012) recommended a rule of thumb that establishes a minimum 
sample size equal to 10 times the number of independent variables. Ringle, Sarstedt, and 
Straub (2012) conducted a review of partial least squares-structural equation modeling 
research published in MIS Quarterly and found a wide variety of sample sizes ranging 
from 17 to 1,449. A total of 109 models were reviewed, and the sample size mean was 
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238.12 and median was 198. There was no recommended method of calculating a sample 
size included in the review. Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan (2015) noted the difficulty in 
determining a sample size for partial least squares-structural equation modeling. Hair et 
al. (2017) provided a table of recommended partial least squares-structural equation 
modeling sample size based on an 80% statistical power. Other factors used to determine 
sample size are significance level, the number of independent variables, and a minimum 
R2. Hair et al. stated that an R2 value of 0.20 would be considered high for behavior 
studies. Because I examined behaviors, a minimum R2 of 0.25 was selected from the 
table. A value of 0.25 is close to the Hair et al. stated value of 0.20. Using the R2 value of 
0.25, a significance level of 5%, and eight independent variables, a sample size of 54 
were used for both the experimental group and the control group. 
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
I decided to use a survey service provider for the recruitment, participation, and 
data collection. SurveyMonkey has recruited over 45 million people who are willing to 
participate in surveys. SurveyMonkey randomly selected participants matching the 
dissertation sample criteria. Participants received an e-mail from SurveyMonkey inviting 
them to complete a survey. Included in the e-mail were instructions to begin the survey. 
A link to a web-based survey was included in the invitation that linked to the additional 
instructions or survey questions (SurveyMonkey Audience’s Answers to the ESOMAR 
28 Questions, 2013). Before beginning the survey, all participants received an informed 
consent document online, and they must affirmatively indicate that they were willing to 
participate in the survey before beginning the survey. If they are not willing to 
97 
 
participate, they can exit from the survey process. Participants completed the online 
survey, and SurveyMonkey collected the response data. Those participants randomly 
assigned by SurveyMonkey to the experimental group received the experimental 
treatment online before beginning the posttest survey. Once they had completed the 
survey process, the participant exieds from the study. There was no poststudy follow-up. 
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs 
For this dissertation, instruments from two different studies were combined. 
Because the research model merges the constructs from protection motivation theory and 
deterrence theory, two prior instruments were merged. Appendix A includes the 
constructs, statements, questions, and their associated sources used to develop the 
instrument. The first half of the merged instrument was used in a study conducted by 
Siponen et al. (2014). A copy of the permitted use letter is provided in Appendix B. 
Siponen et al. conducted a study on behavioral intention to comply with information 
security policies. A population of Finnish corporate employees was used for the study. 
Protection motivation theory was used as the theoretical foundation. Four protection 
motivation theory constructs, perceived threat severity, perceived threat vulnerability, 
response efficacy, and self-efficacy, were used in the research model. These are the same 
protection motivation theory constructs used in this dissertation model. Because Siponen 
et al. examined information security policy behavioral intention using four constructs 
from protection motivation theory and I examined the same outcome using the same 
constructs, this use of the instrument was appropriate.  
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Siponen et al. (2014) performed content validation of the instrument during a pilot 
test and reported the reliability and validity tests supported all of the instrument 
constructs. Convergent validity was assessed using confirmatory factor analysis for each 
of the constructs. Factor loadings were calculated for all constructs, and all factor 
loadings exceeded the 0.5 threshold. Discriminant validity was determined using 
correlations between all pairs of constructs. All correlations exceeded the 0.9 threshold 
value. Variance extracted values exceeded the threshold value of 0.5 for all constructs. 
Cronbach’s alphas were calculated to determine internal consistency. All values exceeded 
the recommended threshold value of 0.6. Composite reliability was calculated, and all 
results exceeded the 0.7 threshold value. These results indicated all constructs had a high 
internal consistency. 
Siponen and Vance (2010) conducted a study on the behavioral intention to 
violate information security policy using deterrence theory as a theoretical foundation. 
The instrument used by Siponen and Vance was used as the second half of the merged 
instrument used for this dissertation. A copy of the permission of use letter is provided in 
Appendix C. A population of Finnish administrative personnel was used for the survey. 
Siponen and Vance created a research model using the constructs of formal sanctions and 
informal sanctions from deterrence theory. Deterrence theory constructs included in the 
instrument were formal sanction certainty, formal sanction severity, informal sanction 
certainty, and informal sanction severity. These four constructs were merged to create 
constructs of formal sanctions and informal sanctions used in the research model. 
Because the instrument included all four deterrence theory constructs, all four of the 
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deterrence theory constructs were used for this dissertation model. Siponen and Vance 
examined information security policy behavioral intention using constructs from 
deterrence theory, and I was also examining information security policy compliance 
behavioral intention using the same deterrence theory constructs. Using the Siponen and 
Vance instrument was appropriate for this dissertation. 
Siponen and Vance (2010) performed a bootstrap analysis to test convergent 
validity. When the indicators load values have a significant t test with their latent 
constructs, convergent validity is demonstrated. All indicator loadings were significant at 
the .001 level indicating convergent validity. Another test of convergent validity is an 
analysis of the average variance extracted values. Average variance extracted is a 
measure of variance explained by latent constructs. This variance should exceed the 
threshold value of 0.5 for all measurement items. All construct average variance extracted 
values exceeded the threshold value and indicated convergent validity. 
Experimental Treatment 
An experimental treatment is a basic element of experimental research design. By 
using an experimental treatment, a researcher is examining the effect of the treatment on 
the participants. An experimental group receives the experimental treatment, and the 
control group does not receive the experimental treatment to measure this effect. A 
posttest survey is administered to both groups of participants. If analysis of the survey 
groups indicates a difference, this difference can be attributed to the experimental 
treatment (Singleton & Straits, 2010). Scholars using protection motivation theory use a 
fear appeal as an experimental treatment. Johnston et al. (2015) used scenarios related to 
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information security measures as a fear appeal in a study on information security 
compliance behavioral intention. For this dissertation, a fear appeal explaining an 
information security policy was used as an experimental treatment. Son (2011) used a 
communication defining an information security policy and employee responsibilities as 
an experimental treatment. This information security policy communication was used in 
Son’s study of information security policy compliance. Full-time employees taken from a 
national data collection company were participants used in the Son study. Son’s 
information security policy communication was used in this dissertation as the 
experimental treatment. Appendix D contains a copy of the permission of use letter. The 
experimental treatment for this research study is presented in Appendix E.  
Data Analysis Plan 
The data analysis included descriptive and inferential statistics. Descriptive 
statistics were calculated for research question survey responses and demographic data. 
Partial least squares-structural equation modeling was the method for calculating 
inferential statistics and was used to examine any relationships between the independent 
and dependent variables. Smart PLS software, version 3.0 was used for statistical 
calculations. Research questions and hypotheses, threats to validity, and ethical 
consideration are also discussed as part of the data analysis plan. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This dissertation focuses on the following research questions: 
RQ1–What is the effect of informal sanction certainty on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral? 
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H01: Informal sanction certainty will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha1: Informal sanction certainty will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ2–What is the effect of informal sanction severity on an individual’s 
behavioral intention to comply with information security policies? 
H02: Informal sanction severity will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha2: Informal sanction severity will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ3–What is the effect of formal sanction certainty on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H03: Formal sanction certainty will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha3: Formal sanction certainty will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ4–What is the effect of formal sanction severity on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H04: Formal sanction severity will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha4: Formal sanction severity will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
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RQ5– What is the effect of perceived threat vulnerability on an individual’s 
behavioral intention to comply with information security policies? 
H05: Perceived threat vulnerability will have a nonpositive affect on an 
individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha5: Perceived threat vulnerability will have a statistically significant positive 
affect on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ6–What is the effect of perceived threat severity on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H06: Perceived threat severity will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha6: Perceived threat severity will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ7–What is the effect of response efficacy on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H07: Response efficacy will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha7: Response efficacy will have a statistically significant positive affect on an 
individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ8–What is the effect of self-efficacy on an individual’s behavioral intention to 
comply with information security policies? 
H08: Self-efficacy will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s information 
security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
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Ha8: Self-efficacy will have a statistically significant positive affect on an 
individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Analysis Plan 
Descriptive statistics were calculated for responses from survey research 
questions and participant demographic data. Descriptive statistical calculations included 
mean, median, frequency, and standard deviation. The first step in the data analysis 
process was model validation. Gefen and Straub (2005) suggested a method for 
examining model validity. Confirmatory factor analysis calculates the model 
measurement item loadings of the latent constructs. Convergent validity is demonstrated 
when the measurement item loads on latent constructs are significant at the 0.05 level. 
Discriminant validity is demonstrated when the average variance extracted for each latent 
construct is larger than the correlation between latent construct pairs. A bootstrap 
technique is used to generate average variance expected values, and the results should 
exceed the 0.50 threshold value. Composite reliability scores, calculated during the 
partial least squares analysis, should exceed the threshold values of 0.7 to demonstrate 
construct measurement reliability (Johnston et al., 2015). 
Partial least squares-structural equation modeling analysis was used to test the 
hypotheses. Siponen and Vance (2010) suggested that partial least squares analysis is 
preferred for model prediction rather than testing theory. A complete partial least 
squares-structural equation modeling analysis was conducted to analyze the relationships 
between the independent and dependent variable. All tests for significance were 
measured at the 0.05 level.  
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Threats to Validity 
Singleton and Straits (2010) identified three threats to validity, measurement 
validity, internal validity, and external validity. A description of each type of validity is 
provided to explain how each threat affects the research analysis. Along with a 
description, methods used to mitigate the different threats are discussed. 
Measurement Validity 
Singleton and Straits (2010) found measurement threat as an effect that occurs 
during the response process because of self-censoring. Although this is a problem in 
laboratory experiments, the reactive measurement effect also occurs during survey and 
field research. Research participants are often placed in a situation they have not 
previously experienced. Participants become aware that they may be asked to do 
something unusual and suspect they have not been informed of the actual purpose of the 
research. When participants become aware of perceiving expected behaviors, these 
perceptions may influence their behavior. 
Singleton and Straits (2010) suggested that participants may misunderstand the 
communicated expectations. A method reducing the bias introduced by the 
misunderstanding is to measure the dependent variable after the independent variable 
manipulation. Because a control group was used in this dissertation research, the control 
group could contribute to the reduction of bias. Johnston et al. (2015) used partial least 
squares-structural equation modeling to validate the measurement model. Partial least 
squares composite reliability scores greater than 0.70 indicates construct measurement 




External validity is described by Singleton and Straits (2010) as the generalization 
of the study results. Generalization refers to the ability of study results applicability 
outside of the study framework. If a study is generalizable, results of the study would be 
similar for participants with different populations and locations. If a study lacks internal 
validity, it cannot be inferred that the manipulated independent variable caused a change 
in the dependent variable and it would not be logical the results can be generalized. 
Because sample selection can limit external validity, care should be taken when 
generalizing results to different groups. By replicating a study, the generalization of the 
theories and hypotheses increases.  
Johnston et al. (2015) determined convergent validity by calculating the loading 
of indicators of their respective latent constructs. Indicator loadings must be significant at 
the 0.05 level to demonstrate convergent validity. Convergent validity is also determined 
by the amount of variance found in latent construct measurements. Average variance 
extracted values for all constructs should exceed 0.50 to indicate a high level of 
convergent validity. Discriminant validity is demonstrated when the indicator loadings 
differences between an intended construct and other constructs are 0.10 or greater. 
Internal Validity 
Singleton and Straits (2010) identified internal validity as a threat to establishing a 
causal relationship. When a study has high internal validity, there is confidence the 
independent variable causes a change in the dependent variable. The research design 
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establishes internal validity, and a true experiment includes the following design 
requirements 
 random assignment; 
 independent variable manipulation; 
 dependent variable measurement; 
 a minimum of one control group; and 
 consistent conditions for all groups. 
Research designs with the previously defined requirements eliminate the possibility of 
extraneous variables affecting the study results. Studies incorporating these requirements 
are internally valid. Random assignment of participants to the experimental and control 
groups establish approximate equal groups and nullifies any difference between 
participants. Group equivalence is also achieved by treating the experimental and control 
groups in the same manner.  
 This dissertation used a posttest-only control group research design. Participants 
were randomly assigned to the experimental group and control group satisfying the first 
requirement. Independent variable manipulation is achieved through the use of an 
experimental treatment and a posttest survey. The survey included elements to measure 
the dependent variable. A control group was used, and participants assigned to this group 
will receive the posttest survey but did not receive the experimental treatment. Finally, all 
groups will experience consistent conditions of completing a web-based survey. Through 
the incorporation of true experiment requirements, this dissertation research model could 




Construct validity is complex because it requires assessment using statistical 
analysis and practical procedures. Demonstrating construct validity involves determining 
if the results from an instrument are “significant, meaningful, useful, and have a purpose” 
(Creswell, 2008, p. 173). Statistical analysis includes 
 examining results relationships; 
 results support the theory as expected; and 
 correlate results with other variables for similarities and differences (Creswell, 
2008). 
If the statistical analysis results indicate there is a good fit between the theoretical 
model and the study data is an indicator construct validity has been achieved (Da Veiga 
& Eloff, 2010). Using confirmatory factor analysis to determine construct validity is 
achieved by analyzing item loading for each construct. Construct validity is verified if the 
loading values exceed 0.6 (Meso et al., 2013). Construct validity also includes reliability, 
convergent validity, and discriminant validity (Chu & Chau, 2014). 
Practical procedures can be used for understanding the results and include 
 examining the significances of data interpretation; 
 examining data relevance and use; and 
 examining the significance of using the study results (Creswell, 2008). 
Ethical Procedures 
Several precautionary measures were taken to ensure the ethical treatment of 
individuals participating in the research study. Before any activities that involve 
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participants, Institutional Review Board approval was obtained. An application with all 
necessary materials was submitted to the Institutional Review Board to initiate the 
approval process (Walden IRB approval no. 03-02-17-0117835). 
Because a survey service provider was used for recruitment and data collection, I 
am removed from direct communications with the participants. This separation does not 
relieve me from ensuring the survey service provider is conducting business in an ethical 
manner. SurveyMonkey was used as the survey service provider, and a review of their 
policies and privacy guidelines was conducted. 
All potential participants were required to provide informed consent by 
acknowledging in the affirmative that they agree to participate in the study and 
understand their responsibilities needed to complete the survey. Any potential participant 
who does not agree with the information in the informed consent form can indicate they 
do not wish to participate and the survey process will terminate. The participant also had 
the ability to exit from the survey process at any point in the survey. 
Data collected from the survey did not contain any personally identifiable 
information. As part of completing the SurveyMonkey profile process, SurveyMonkey 
contribute members may have provided SurveyMonkey personally identifiable 
information. This information remained with SurveyMonkey and was not be provided to 
me. At the conclusion of the survey process, survey response data and participant 
demographics were downloaded from SurveyMonkey. Survey data was stored in a 
password-protected file on a password protected computer. Survey data was archived on 
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optical media in a password protected file. Data stored on the computer and archived on 
optical media will be destroyed seven years after the publication of the dissertation. 
SurveyMonkey will collect survey data, and I will have no knowledge or 
influence on the selection of participants. Using a third-party survey service provider 
eliminates the possibility of a conflict of interest between the participants and me. 
SurveyMonkey does offer an incentive to their SurveyMonkey contribute members in the 
form of a contribution to a charity selected by the member. Because this arrangement is 
between SurveyMonkey and the survey participant, there is no conflict of interest with 
me. 
Summary 
The research method presented in the chapter described the research design, 
methodology, data analysis plan, and threats to validity. A quantitative experimental 
posttest-only control group research design was used for this dissertation. A description 
of the methodology included the elements population, sampling, participant recruitment, 
instrument development, and experimental treatment. The data analysis plan begins with 
the research questions and hypotheses describing the independent and dependent 
variables and their relationships. Analysis of the data included descriptive and inferential 
statistics. Variable relationships were analyzed using partial least squares-structural 
equation modeling and SmartPLS 3.0 software. Threats to validity include measurement, 
external, internal, and construct validity. Methods used to determine these validity factors 
were discussed. Concluding the chapter is a discussion on those ethical procedures 
implemented to protect study participants. 
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Chapter 4: Results  
The purpose of this quantitative, experimental study was to examine the 
relationship between constructs from protection motivation theory and deterrence theory 
and information security policy compliance behavioral intention. Protection motivation 
theory constructs were merged with constructs from deterrence theory to develop a 
research model. Protection motivation theory constructs included in the research model 
were perceived threat vulnerability, perceived threat severity, response efficacy, and self-
efficacy. Included in the research model were the deterrence theory constructs: formal 
sanction certainty, formal sanction severity, informal sanction certainty, and informal 
sanction severity. The following research questions were developed to examine the 
theory constructs effect on information security policy compliance behavioral intention: 
RQ1–What is the effect of informal sanction certainty on individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H01: Informal sanction certainty will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha1: Informal sanction certainty will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ2–What is the effect of informal sanction severity on an individual’s 
behavioral intention to comply with information security policies? 
H02: Informal sanction severity will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
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Ha 2: Informal sanction severity will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ3–What is the effect of formal sanction certainty on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H03: Formal sanction certainty will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha3: Formal sanction certainty will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ4–What is the effect of formal sanction severity on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H04: Formal sanction severity will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha4: Formal sanction severity will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ5–What is the effect of perceived threat vulnerability on an individual’s 
behavioral intention to comply with information security policies? 
H05: Perceived threat vulnerability will have a nonpositive affect on an 
individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha5: Perceived threat vulnerability will have a statistically significant positive 
affect on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ6–What is the effect of perceived threat severity on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
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H06: Perceived threat severity will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha6: Perceived threat severity will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ7–What is the effect of response efficacy on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H07: Response efficacy will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha7: Response efficacy will have a statistically significant positive affect on an 
individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ8–What is the effect of self-efficacy on an individual’s behavioral intention to 
comply with information security policies? 
H08: Self-efficacy will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s information 
security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha8: Self-efficacy will have a statistically significant positive affect on an 
individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
 Chapter 4 begins with a review of the data collection process used to gather 
survey responses. Following the data collection process discussion is a description of the 
experimental treatment implementation and study results. The study results include the 
descriptive statistics of the survey responses, a partial least squares-structural equation 




Data collection for the study began with the development of the web-based 
SurveyMonkey survey. Appendix A includes the statements and questions used to create 
the survey. On March 4, 2017, the SurveyMonkey audience population described in 
Chapter 3 received the survey, and the data collection concluded on March 9, 2017. A 
sample size of 54 responses for the experimental group and 54 responses for the control 
group was the plan described in Chapter 3, but SurveyMonkey suspended the survey 
before receiving 54 completed responses for each group. SurveyMonkey has a policy 
where surveys with an above-average abandonment rate are paused (Buying Responses 
with SurveyMonkey Audience, 2017). The number of individuals beginning the survey 
but not completing the survey determines the abandonment rate. Restarting a survey a 
second time is possible, but a second paused survey resulted in suspending the survey. 
SurveyMonkey support notified me that the survey had an above-average abandonment 
rate causing a survey pause. SurveyMonkey restarted the survey, but a second above-
average abandonment rate caused the survey suspension. At the conclusion of the survey, 
there were 34 completed survey responses from the experimental group, and 33 
completed survey responses from the control group. Because the number of responses did 
not equal the sample size, the survey was relaunched to gather additional responses. The 
survey was distributed a second time to the SurveyMonkey audience population on 
March 14, 2017, and the data collection concluded on March 21, 2017. This survey 
experienced a similar abandonment rate as the first survey. An additional 39 responses 
for the experimental group and 40 responses for the control group were received. A total 
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of 73 responses for the experimental group and 73 responses for the control group were 
received. The recommendations section of Chapter 5 includes a discussion on the 
feedback received from SurveyMonkey regarding the causes of a high abandonment rate 
and suggestions for improvement.  
Basic demographic information for the control and experimental group responses 
included age and gender. Age information provided by SurveyMonkey is in age ranges 
and not individual ages. For the control group, 13 respondents were aged 18 to 29, 22 
were aged 30 to 44, 33 were aged 45 to 59, and five were 60 and older. Experimental 
group respondents had three aged 18 to 29, 15 aged 30 to 44, 36 aged 45 to 59, and 19 
aged 60 and older. Gender for the control group was 33 female respondents and 40 male 
respondents. For the experimental group, 28 respondents were female, and 45 were male. 
A description was not provided regarding sample population representation or 
proportionality to the larger population because of the random selection of participants. 
The study results section includes additional demographic descriptive statistics. 
Experimental Treatment 
Each experimental group participant received an experimental treatment regarding 
information security policies and associated employee responsibilities. Appendix E 
presents the full text of the experimental treatment. Administration of the experimental 
treatment was completed as planned. Before the start of the survey, participants in the 
experimental group were asked to read the experimental treatment. After reading the 
experimental treatment, the experimental group participant began the survey. There were 




The process of data analysis started with a download of the survey responses from 
SurveyMonkey. Before initiating a download, the responses were filtered to include only 
completed responses. This filter is a part of the SurveyMonkey response analysis process. 
Although the intention of applying the filter was to provide only completed responses, 
some of the responses were not complete. Several survey responses were removed from 
the dataset because they had missing data items. I removed three survey responses from 
the dataset, two from the control group and one from the experimental group. The data 
set included a respondent ID field used to identify each survey response uniquely. The 
respondent IDs were examined using Microsoft Excel to identify any duplicate 
respondent IDs. No duplicate respondent IDs were identified indicating no individual 
provided more than one survey response. Adding data variable names to the data set 
uniquely identified each dataset field. The constructs column of Appendix A contains the 
data variable name used for each of the individual survey responses. 
Demographic Information 
Demographic information provided by SurveyMonkey included gender and age 
group. SurveyMonkey does not provide individual ages. I included two additional 
demographic questions regarding information security policy training and awareness. 
Because there were two groups of respondents, each of the demographic descriptive 
statistics is provided by the participant group. Gender for the control group was 43.7% 
female and 56.3% male. For the experimental group, the gender was 38.9% female and 
61.1% male. Table 1 presents additional gender frequency information. 
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Table 1  
Participant Gender Frequency 
Participant Gender Frequency 
Group Female Male Total 
Control 31 40 71 
 43.7% 56.3% 
 
Experimental 28 44 72 
 38.9% 61.1% 
 
 
Age groups were divided into ranges of 18 to 29 years, 30 to 44 years, 45 to 59 years, and 
60 years and older. Ages for the control group were 13 aged 18 to 29, 22 aged 30 to 44, 
31 aged 45 to 59, and five for 60 and over. Experimental group participants age groups 
were three aged 18 to 29, 14 aged 30 to 44, 36 aged 45 to 59, and 19 for 60 and over. 
Table 2 contains both age group counts and percentages. 
Table 2  
Participant Ages by Group 
Participant Ages 
Group 18 - 29 30 - 44 45 - 59 60+ Total 
Control 13 22 31 5 71 
 18.3% 31.0% 43.7% 7.0% 
 
Experimental 3 14 36 19 72 
 4.2% 19.4% 50.0% 26.4% 
 
 
The survey included two additional questions regarding information security policy 
training and awareness. Each participant responded to questions about his or her 
information security policy training and awareness of his or her organization’s 
information security policy. The control group respondents indicated that 93.0% had 
received information security policy training, and 7.0% did not receive any training. For 
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the experimental group, 86.1% indicated that they had received training, and 13.9% did 
not receive any training. Table 3 presents additional information on group counts and 
percentages. 
Table 3  
Information Security Policy Training 
Received Training 
Group No Yes  
Control 5 66 71 
 7.0% 93.0% 
 
Experimental 10 62 72 
 13.9% 86.1% 
 
 
Table 4 presents participant information security policy awareness counts and 
percentages. This information indicates that 95.8% of the control group and 93.1% of the 
experimental group were aware of their organization’s information security policy. 
Table 4 
Information Security Policy Awareness 
Policy Awareness 
Group No Yes  
Control 3 68 71 
 4.2% 95.8% 
 
Experimental 5 67 72 
 6.9% 93.1% 
 
 
The next step in the data analysis process was the partial least squares-structural equation 




 The steps used to conduct a partial least squares-structural equation modeling 
analysis follow the method described by Hair et al. (2017). Steps included in the Hair et 
al. method were used to develop the structural model, specify the measurement model, 
data collection, model estimation, measurement model evaluation, and assessing results. 
Because the study included two groups, the process was performed twice, once for the 
control group responses and a second time for the experimental group responses. I used 
the SmartPLS 3.0 software package to perform all partial least squares-structural equation 
modeling calculations.  
Structural model. Development of the structural model began with creating the 
model variables and variable relationships. The research model presented in Figure 1 
served as the theoretical framework for the structural model. Each box of the research 
model became a structural model variable, and the relationships of the research model 




Figure 3. Partial least squares-structural equation modeling structural model. 
Measurement model. Developing the measurement model was the next step and 
required assigning constructs to the variables. Constructs used in the model are described 
in Appendix A and were assigned to the associated variable. Figure 4 displays the 




Figure 4. Partial least squares-structural equation modeling measurement model. 
Because there were two groups included in the study, I created two models in SmartPLS, 
one for the control group and a second model for the experimental group. The structural 
model in Figure 3 and the measurement model in Figure 4 were identical for both groups. 
Assigning the constructs to the variable establishes a connection between the variable and 
the survey response data. Data collection concluded before the development of the partial 
least squares-structural equation modeling model. For the data collection step of the 
process, the corresponding response data were imported into each model. Calculation of 




Table 5 presents the construct descriptive statistics of the control group data, and 
Table 6 presents the experimental group data construct descriptive statistics. 
Table 5  
Control Group Descriptive Statistics 
Control Group Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Behavioral_intention_1 4.704 5 0.758 
Behavioral_intention_2 4.676 5 0.765 
Behavioral_intention_3 4.521 5 0.853 
Self-efficacy_1 4.479 5 0.802 
Self-efficacy_2 4.366 5 0.953 
Self-efficacy_3 4.31 5 1.001 
Perceived_Severity_1 4.211 5 1.006 
Perceived_Severity_2 4.437 5 0.945 
Perceived_Severity_3 4.577 5 0.725 
Perceived_Vulnerability_1 3.887 4 1.015 
Perceived_Vulnerability_2 4.183 4 0.969 
Perceived_Vulnerability_3 3.93 4 1.117 
Response_efficacy_1 4.127 4 0.933 
Response_efficacy_2 4.535 5 0.766 
Response_efficacy_3 4.521 5 0.767 
Formal_sanctions_certainty_1 4.014 4 1.193 
Formal_sanctions_certainty_2 4.07 4 1.142 
Formal_sanctions_certainty_3 4.268 5 1.034 
Formal_sanctions_severity_1 4.366 5 1.065 
Formal_sanctions_severity_2 4.38 5 1.053 
Formal_sanctions_severity_3 4.296 5 1.093 
Informal_sanctions_certainty_1 4.113 4 1.082 
Informal_sanctions_certainty_2 4.155 5 1.109 
Informal_sanctions_certainty_3 4.268 5 1.006 
Informal_sanctions_severity_1 4.042 5 1.261 
Informal_sanctions_severity_2 4.268 5 1.174 





Table 6  
Experimental Group Descriptive Statistics 
Experimental Group Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Behavioral_intention_1 4.611 5 0.657 
Behavioral_intention_2 4.431 5 0.779 
Behavioral_intention_3 4.375 5 0.716 
Self-efficacy_1 4.542 5 0.644 
Self-efficacy_2 4.125 4 0.849 
Self-efficacy_3 4.153 4 0.952 
Perceived_Severity_1 4.153 4 0.908 
Perceived_Severity_2 4.458 5 0.744 
Perceived_Severity_3 4.347 5 0.819 
Perceived_Vulnerability_1 3.667 4 1.041 
Perceived_Vulnerability_2 4.319 4 0.779 
Perceived_Vulnerability_3 3.819 4 0.962 
Response_efficacy_1 3.875 4 0.985 
Response_efficacy_2 4.472 5 0.707 
Response_efficacy_3 4.278 4 0.768 
Formal_sanctions_certainty_1 4.125 4 0.957 
Formal_sanctions_certainty_2 4.181 4 0.918 
Formal_sanctions_certainty_3 4.194 4 0.892 
Formal_sanctions_severity_1 4.236 4 0.874 
Formal_sanctions_severity_2 4.042 4 1.020 
Formal_sanctions_severity_3 4.000 4 0.943 
Informal_sanctions_certainty_1 3.903 4 1.069 
Informal_sanctions_certainty_2 4.181 5 1.058 
Informal_sanctions_certainty_3 4.181 5 0.976 
Informal_sanctions_severity_1 3.917 4 1.010 
Informal_sanctions_severity_2 4.000 4 1.080 
Informal_sanctions_severity_3 3.903 4 1.095 
 
With the structural and measurement models created in SmartPLS and data imported into 




 Model estimation is the process of applying the partial least squares-structural 
equation modeling algorithm to the model and data. The SmartPLS calculate function 
initiates the model estimation. Hair et al. (2017) recommend using a stop criterion of 1 x 
10-7 and 300 maximum iterations. Results of the model estimation include the path 
coefficients and quality criteria. Table 7 presents the path coefficients for the control and 
experimental groups.  
Table 7  











Formal Sanction Certainty -0.220 0.066 
Formal Sanction Severity 0.148 -0.353 
Informal Sanction 
Certainty 0.063 0.248 
Informal Sanction 
Severity -0.012 0.124 
Perceived Severity  0.084 0.245 
Perceived Vulnerability  0.160 0.050 
Response efficacy  0.332 0.115 
Self-efficacy  0.467 0.373 
 
Quality criteria of the results are presented in the measurement model validation and 
assessing results discussion. 
Measurement Model Validation 
 A quality criteria evaluation of the measurement and structural models examines 
the metrics indicating the predictive abilities of the model. An evaluation of the 
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measurement model includes examining internal consistency, convergent validity, and 
discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2017). Internal consistency includes calculating 
Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability. Calculations of Cronbach’s alpha and 
composite reliability are part of the SmartPLS quality criteria calculations. Table 8 
presents the Cronbach’s alpha for both the control and experimental groups. 
Table 8  











Behavioral Intention 0.929 0.884 
Formal Sanction Certainty 0.924 0.938 
Formal Sanction Severity 0.942 0.938 
Informal Sanction Certainty 0.912 0.921 
Informal Sanction Severity 0.914 0.902 
Perceived Severity  0.817 0.717 
Perceived Vulnerability  0.874 0.695 
Response efficacy  0.816 0.781 
Self-efficacy  0.741 0.725 
 
Cronbach’s alpha values of 0.70 and greater are considered acceptable (Hair et al., 2017). 
All the Cronbach’s alpha values for the control group were acceptable. The experimental 
group’s Cronbach’s alpha value for Perceived Vulnerability was not acceptable. All the 
remaining experimental group Cronbach’s alpha values were acceptable. Table 9 presents 




Table 9  











Behavioral Intention 0.955 0.928 
Formal Sanction Certainty 0.952 0.960 
Formal Sanction Severity 0.963 0.960 
Informal Sanction Certainty 0.944 0.950 
Informal Sanction Severity 0.946 0.938 
Perceived Severity  0.889 0.838 
Perceived Vulnerability  0.922 0.828 
Response efficacy  0.890 0.873 
Self-efficacy  0.852 0.840 
 
Composite reliability values in the range between 0.70 and 0.90 are acceptable. Values 
exceeding 0.95 are not acceptable (Hair et al., 2017). Several of the composite reliability 
values fall into the unacceptable range.  
Examining convergent validity includes calculating indicator reliability and 
average variance extracted. Indicator reliability is also called outer loadings, and all 
indicators should be statistically significant. Outer loading values greater than .708 are 
considered significant (Hair et al., 2017). Table 10 presents the outer loading values for 




Table 10  











Behavioral_intention_1 0.937 0.886 
Behavioral_intention_2 0.972 0.916 
Behavioral_intention_3 0.899 0.900 
Formal_sanctions_certainty_1 0.931 0.922 
Formal_sanctions_certainty_2 0.959 0.954 
Formal_sanctions_certainty_3 0.906 0.954 
Formal_sanctions_severity_1 0.957 0.938 
Formal_sanctions_severity_2 0.958 0.959 
Formal_sanctions_severity_3 0.924 0.930 
Informal_sanctions_certainty_1 0.923 0.894 
Informal_sanctions_certainty_2 0.911 0.937 
Informal_sanctions_certainty_3 0.930 0.956 
Informal_sanctions_severity_1 0.956 0.913 
Informal_sanctions_severity_2 0.867 0.936 
Informal_sanctions_severity_3 0.947 0.892 
Perceived_Severity_1 0.800 0.850 
Perceived_Severity_2 0.878 0.776 
Perceived_Severity_3 0.879 0.759 
Perceived_Vulnerability_1 0.874 0.678 
Perceived_Vulnerability_2 0.904 0.866 
Perceived_Vulnerability_3 0.899 0.805 
Response_efficacy_1 0.621 0.671 
Response_efficacy_2 0.955 0.915 
Response_efficacy_3 0.954 0.900 
Self-efficacy_1 0.621 0.802 
Self-efficacy_2 0.920 0.761 
Self-efficacy_3 0.870 0.828 
 
All the outer loading values are significant except response_efficacy_1 and self-
efficacy_1 for the control group and perceived_vulnerability_1 and response_efficacy_1 
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for the experimental group indicating these constructs do not demonstrate convergent 
validity. Table 11 presents the average variance extracted values for the control and 
experimental groups. 
Table 11  













Behavioral Intention 0.876 0.812 
Formal Sanction Certainty 0.869 0.890 
Formal Sanction Severity 0.895 0.888 
Informal Sanction Certainty 0.849 0.864 
Informal Sanction Severity 0.854 0.835 
Perceived Severity  0.728 0.634 
Perceived Vulnerability  0.797 0.619 
Response efficacy  0.736 0.699 
Self-efficacy  0.663 0.636 
 
Average variance extracted values exceeding 0.50 indicate the construct explains more 
than half the indicator variance (Hair et al., 2017). All the average variance extracted 
values exceed the 0.50 threshold and are acceptable. 
Examining a model’s cross loadings and Fornell-Larcker criterion determines 
discriminant validity. Demonstration of discriminant validity occurs when the construct’s 
correlation is greater than the other construct’s correlation. In this case, the construct’s 
outer loadings would be greater than the cross loadings of the other constructs. The 
bolded values in the tables identify the construct’s outer loadings. These values should be 
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greater than the other construct’s cross loadings. Table 12 presents the cross loadings for 





Table 12  
























Behavioral_intention_1 0.937 0.296 0.447 0.439 0.409 0.682 0.537 0.694 0.682 
Behavioral_intention_2 0.972 0.282 0.443 0.454 0.468 0.689 0.554 0.694 0.689 
Behavioral_intention_3 0.899 0.315 0.367 0.442 0.497 0.706 0.526 0.632 0.660 
Formal_sanctions_certainty_1 0.258 0.931 0.552 0.688 0.515 0.387 0.504 0.490 0.195 
Formal_sanctions_certainty_2 0.311 0.959 0.641 0.692 0.506 0.365 0.461 0.448 0.263 
Formal_sanctions_certainty_3 0.313 0.906 0.733 0.744 0.528 0.295 0.465 0.437 0.239 
Formal_sanctions_severity_1 0.400 0.699 0.957 0.765 0.619 0.457 0.461 0.462 0.233 
Formal_sanctions_severity_2 0.448 0.686 0.958 0.769 0.682 0.513 0.523 0.498 0.254 
Formal_sanctions_severity_3 0.423 0.588 0.924 0.812 0.734 0.461 0.504 0.420 0.255 
Informal_sanctions_certainty_1 0.454 0.734 0.744 0.923 0.761 0.469 0.595 0.649 0.262 
Informal_sanctions_certainty_2 0.340 0.744 0.762 0.911 0.717 0.371 0.489 0.350 0.225 
Informal_sanctions_certainty_3 0.493 0.644 0.780 0.930 0.748 0.543 0.619 0.547 0.292 
Informal_sanctions_severity_1 0.457 0.474 0.603 0.746 0.956 0.518 0.489 0.525 0.311 
Informal_sanctions_severity_2 0.463 0.615 0.783 0.781 0.867 0.505 0.471 0.453 0.354 
Informal_sanctions_severity_3 0.429 0.438 0.595 0.704 0.947 0.514 0.464 0.514 0.261 
Perceived_Severity_1 0.453 0.374 0.497 0.498 0.533 0.800 0.613 0.598 0.395 
Perceived_Severity_2 0.639 0.274 0.363 0.351 0.459 0.878 0.524 0.512 0.562 
Perceived_Severity_3 0.742 0.325 0.456 0.478 0.459 0.879 0.606 0.728 0.585 
Perceived_Vulnerability_1 0.468 0.501 0.440 0.613 0.515 0.601 0.874 0.649 0.270 
Perceived_Vulnerability_2 0.599 0.414 0.497 0.516 0.427 0.658 0.904 0.566 0.277 
Perceived_Vulnerability_3 0.450 0.465 0.462 0.556 0.447 0.529 0.899 0.600 0.233 
Response_efficacy_1 0.336 0.537 0.521 0.612 0.531 0.431 0.700 0.621 0.219 
Response_efficacy_2 0.753 0.432 0.427 0.485 0.482 0.708 0.568 0.955 0.510 
Response_efficacy_3 0.669 0.389 0.397 0.494 0.451 0.679 0.585 0.954 0.445 
Self-efficacy_1 0.377 0.151 0.032 0.100 0.155 0.197 0.054 0.195 0.621 
Self-efficacy_2 0.734 0.253 0.311 0.344 0.397 0.653 0.370 0.500 0.920 
Self-efficacy_3 0.589 0.197 0.223 0.197 0.217 0.550 0.212 0.416 0.870 
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All the control group outer loadings are greater than the other cross loadings except 
response_efficacy_1 and self-efficacy_1 indicating these constructs do not demonstrate 




Table 13  
























Behavioral_intention_1 0.886 0.397 0.279 0.527 0.314 0.494 0.349 0.510 0.604 
Behavioral_intention_2 0.916 0.428 0.307 0.443 0.400 0.465 0.337 0.430 0.553 
Behavioral_intention_3 0.900 0.355 0.258 0.364 0.316 0.572 0.431 0.512 0.507 
Formal_sanctions_certainty_1 0.400 0.922 0.504 0.708 0.580 0.401 0.250 0.511 0.361 
Formal_sanctions_certainty_2 0.400 0.954 0.594 0.706 0.621 0.331 0.223 0.470 0.370 
Formal_sanctions_certainty_3 0.434 0.954 0.647 0.782 0.600 0.401 0.256 0.526 0.373 
Formal_sanctions_severity_1 0.327 0.568 0.938 0.716 0.719 0.514 0.230 0.493 0.336 
Formal_sanctions_severity_2 0.315 0.580 0.959 0.705 0.789 0.572 0.345 0.493 0.348 
Formal_sanctions_severity_3 0.217 0.611 0.930 0.663 0.786 0.544 0.365 0.444 0.246 
Informal_sanctions_certainty_1 0.421 0.735 0.650 0.894 0.728 0.471 0.311 0.468 0.373 
Informal_sanctions_certainty_2 0.482 0.740 0.727 0.937 0.702 0.497 0.313 0.516 0.423 
Informal_sanctions_certainty_3 0.479 0.697 0.684 0.956 0.700 0.515 0.306 0.557 0.356 
Informal_sanctions_severity_1 0.364 0.599 0.675 0.717 0.913 0.453 0.391 0.438 0.274 
Informal_sanctions_severity_2 0.371 0.618 0.806 0.731 0.936 0.517 0.347 0.520 0.279 
Informal_sanctions_severity_3 0.298 0.518 0.732 0.632 0.892 0.397 0.278 0.398 0.262 
Perceived_Severity_1 0.554 0.436 0.530 0.559 0.483 0.850 0.474 0.588 0.478 
Perceived_Severity_2 0.378 0.305 0.490 0.404 0.439 0.776 0.472 0.570 0.298 
Perceived_Severity_3 0.387 0.174 0.336 0.261 0.255 0.759 0.513 0.490 0.448 
Perceived_Vulnerability_1 0.227 0.132 0.181 0.196 0.283 0.314 0.678 0.293 0.143 
Perceived_Vulnerability_2 0.365 0.271 0.266 0.261 0.255 0.476 0.866 0.422 0.279 
Perceived_Vulnerability_3 0.359 0.186 0.301 0.314 0.353 0.594 0.805 0.418 0.348 
Response_efficacy_1 0.316 0.488 0.598 0.612 0.610 0.598 0.430 0.671 0.352 
Response_efficacy_2 0.550 0.430 0.319 0.387 0.307 0.587 0.416 0.915 0.428 
Response_efficacy_3 0.447 0.459 0.457 0.476 0.437 0.581 0.405 0.900 0.403 
Self-efficacy_1 0.609 0.391 0.301 0.423 0.273 0.459 0.268 0.404 0.802 
Self-efficacy_2 0.405 0.224 0.255 0.243 0.217 0.388 0.239 0.354 0.761 
Self-efficacy_3 0.406 0.278 0.235 0.277 0.203 0.377 0.312 0.356 0.828 
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For the experimental group, all the outer loadings exceeded the other construct’s cross 
loadings demonstrating discriminant validity. The other measure of discriminant validity 
is the Fornell-Larcker criterion. The Table 14 and Table 15 presents the Fornell-Larcker 
criterion results for the control group and experimental group, respectively.  
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Table 14  

























Behavioral Intention 0.936         
Formal Sanction 
Certainty 0.318 0.932        
Formal Sanction 
Severity 0.449 0.695 0.946       
Informal Sanction 
Certainty 0.476 0.761 0.826 0.922      
Informal Sanction 
Severity 0.488 0.554 0.718 0.807 0.924     
Perceived Severity  0.739 0.372 0.505 0.511 0.555 0.853    
Perceived 
Vulnerability  0.576 0.510 0.525 0.625 0.515 0.674 0.892   
Response efficacy  0.720 0.490 0.487 0.575 0.539 0.723 0.673 0.858  






Table 15  
























Behavioral Intention 0.901         
Formal Sanction 
Certainty 0.437 0.943        
Formal Sanction 
Severity 0.312 0.618 0.942       
Informal Sanction 
Certainty 0.497 0.778 0.740 0.929      
Informal Sanction 
Severity 0.380 0.636 0.807 0.762 0.914     
Perceived Severity  0.566 0.401 0.575 0.532 0.503 0.796    
Perceived 
Vulnerability  0.413 0.258 0.325 0.333 0.374 0.604 0.787   
Response efficacy  0.539 0.533 0.509 0.554 0.498 0.690 0.488 0.836  
Self-efficacy  0.618 0.390 0.337 0.414 0.297 0.521 0.342 0.471 0.797 
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Bolded items in the table are the square root of the construct’s average variance expected. 
This value should be greater than the construct’s correlation with the other constructs. 
This condition is satisfied for both groups because the square root of the average variance 
expected is greater than the other constructs demonstrating discriminant validity. All the 
measurement model evaluation methods provide insight into construct measure validity. 
Structural model evaluation methods examine the model's ability to predict dependent 
variable variance (Hair et al., 2017).  
Structural Model Validation 
In assessing the results of the structural model, the coefficients of determination, 
predictive relevance, size and significance of the path coefficients, and f 2 and q2 effect 
sizes were included (Hair et al., 2017). The primary analysis method for structural model 
validation is the coefficients of determination or R2 values. Table 16 presents the R2 
values for the control and experimental groups.  
Table 16  
Coefficients of Determination 
 Control Group Experimental Group 
 R Square 
R Square 
Adjusted R Square 
R Square 
Adjusted 
Behavioral Intention 0.752 0.720 0.540 0.482 
 
In addition to the R2 value is the R2 adjusted value. An R2 adjusted calculation takes 
model complexity and sample size into consideration to avoid complex model bias (Hair 
et al., 2017). Hair et al. (2017) stated defining an acceptable R2 is dependent on model 
complexity and research discipline. Model complexity and research discipline variability 
136 
 
make defining a rule for acceptable R2 values difficult. Hair et al. identified an R2 value 
of 0.20 as high for consumer behavior research. Hair et al. also defined R2 values of 0.75, 
0.50, and 0.25 respectively as substantial, moderate, and weak values for marketing 
research. Predictive relevance, or Q2, is the next step in the analysis of the structural 
model. 
A blindfolding calculation was performed on the model to determine predictive 
relevance. The output from the blindfolding calculation was a construct crossvalidated 
redundancy report. Table 17 presents a construct crossvalidated redundancy report for the 
control and experimental groups.  
Table 17  
Construct Crossvalidated Redundancy Report 
 Construct Crossvalidated Redundancy   
 Control Group Experimental Group 
 SSO SSE Q² (=1-SSE/SSO) SSO SSE Q² (=1-SSE/SSO) 
Behavioral Intention 213 93.246 0.562 216 140.105 0.351 
Formal Sanction Certainty 213 213  216 216  
Formal Sanction Severity 213 213  216 216  
Informal Sanction Certainty 213 213  216 216  
Informal Sanction Severity 213 213  216 216  
Perceived Severity  213 213  216 216  
Perceived Vulnerability  213 213  216 216  
Response efficacy  213 213  216 216  
Self-efficacy  213 213  216 216  
 
The Q2 value for the variable Behavioral Intention is greater than zero for both the 
control and experimental groups. The Q2 value for Behavioral Intention is 0.562 and 
0.351 for the control and experimental groups respectively. Although the path coefficient 
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calculations are part of the partial least squares algorithm, an additional calculation is 
necessary to compute path coefficient significance. 
A bootstrapping process calculates additional statistical information on the path 
coefficients. The output from the bootstrapping calculation includes the path coefficients, 
t values, and p-values for each variable. Each of the path coefficient’s p-value is used to 
determine if the path coefficient is statistically significant. Bootstrapping calculation 
results for the control group are presented in Table 18. Table 19 presents the 




Table 18  










(|O/STDEV|) p Values 
Significance 
(p < 0.05) 
Formal Sanction Certainty -> Behavioral Intention -0.22 -0.205 0.112 1.964 0.050 No 
Formal Sanction Severity -> Behavioral Intention 0.148 0.139 0.135 1.092 0.276 No 
Informal Sanction Certainty -> Behavioral Intention 0.063 0.065 0.162 0.392 0.695 No 
Informal Sanction Severity -> Behavioral Intention -0.012 0.002 0.123 0.100 0.920 No 
Perceived Severity -> Behavioral Intention 0.084 0.088 0.126 0.668 0.505 No 
Perceived Vulnerability -> Behavioral Intention 0.16 0.149 0.109 1.470 0.142 No 
Response efficacy -> Behavioral Intention 0.332 0.306 0.133 2.495 0.013 Yes 





Table 19  










(|O/STDEV|) p Values 
Significance 
(p < 0.05) 
Formal Sanction Certainty -> Behavioral Intention 0.066 0.061 0.158 0.416 0.678 No 
Formal Sanction Severity -> Behavioral Intention -0.353 -0.344 0.182 1.943 0.053 No 
Informal Sanction Certainty -> Behavioral Intention 0.248 0.207 0.203 1.222 0.222 No 
Informal Sanction Severity -> Behavioral Intention 0.124 0.152 0.198 0.629 0.53 No 
Perceived Severity -> Behavioral Intention 0.245 0.244 0.165 1.479 0.14 No 
Perceived Vulnerability -> Behavioral Intention 0.05 0.044 0.111 0.454 0.65 No 
Response efficacy -> Behavioral Intention 0.115 0.12 0.203 0.568 0.57 No 




A 95% significance level was used to determine path coefficient significance. A p-value 
less than 0.05 would indicate a statistically significant path coefficient. Examining the 
bootstrapping results tables indicates only the self-efficacy path coefficient for the control 
group and self-efficacy and response efficacy path coefficients for the experimental 
group are significant. The final step in the model structure analysis is the calculation of 
the f 2 and q2 effect sizes. 
 The f 2 and q2 effect sizes provide additional information about the quality of the 
model estimations (Hair et al., 2017). A change in the R2 value when a construct is 
removed is analyzed to determine if the change has a substantive effect. The 
measurement of this change is the f 2 effect size. Values of 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 are 
considered small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively. Table 20 presents the f 2 
effect size calculations results for the control and experimental group variables. 
Table 20  
Variable f 2 Effect Size 










Formal Sanction Certainty 0.073 Medium 0.003 Small 
Formal Sanction Severity 0.025 Medium 0.076 Medium 
Informal Sanction Certainty 0.002 Small 0.033 Medium 
Informal Sanction Severity 0.000 Small 0.009 Small 
Perceived Severity  0.008 Small 0.044 Medium 
Perceived Vulnerability  0.038 Medium 0.003 Small 
Response efficacy  0.167 Large 0.012 Small 
Self-efficacy  0.496 Large 0.202 Large 
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Only the Self-efficacy variable for the experimental group has a large effect size. For the 
control group, the response efficacy and self-efficacy variables had a large effect size. 
The remaining variables for both groups had either small or medium effect sizes. 
Calculation of the q2 effect sizes is calculated using the previously defined Q2 values. 
Because the q2 effect size calculation uses the difference in the Q2 values and only one 
variable had a positive Q2 value, calculation of the q2 effect sizes was not possible. A 
final inter-group response difference statistical analysis will be the final step of the study 
results. 
Group Difference Analysis 
 Because the study includes two groups of participants, a comparison of group 
survey responses was performed to analyze statistical differences between the groups. For 
each construct, a comparison was made between the response mean and the standard 
deviation. An algorithm described by Aczel and Sounderpandian (2006) for calculating a 
Z test statistic compared the statistical difference between two means. The mean 
statistical difference test used a null hypothesis assuming there was no statistical 
difference between the means. Elements included in the algorithm were construct mean 
and standard deviation, significance level, and sample size. A 95% significance level and 
sample size of 71 and 72 for the control and experimental groups, respectively, were used 





Table 21  
Construct Mean Statistical Difference Comparison 









Deviation p-value µ1-µ2=0 
Behavioral_intention_1 4.704 0.758 4.611 0.657 0.433 Not Reject 
Behavioral_intention_2 4.676 0.765 4.431 0.779 0.058 Not Reject 
Behavioral_intention_3 4.521 0.853 4.375 0.716 0.268 Not Reject 
Self-efficacy_1 4.479 0.802 4.542 0.644 0.605 Not Reject 
Self-efficacy_2 4.366 0.953 4.125 0.849 0.110 Not Reject 
Self-efficacy_3 4.310 1.001 4.153 0.952 0.337 Not Reject 
Perceived_Severity_1 4.211 1.006 4.153 0.908 0.718 Not Reject 
Perceived_Severity_2 4.437 0.945 4.458 0.744 0.883 Not Reject 
Perceived_Severity_3 4.577 0.725 4.347 0.819 0.075 Not Reject 
Perceived_Vulnerability_1 3.887 1.015 3.667 1.041 0.201 Not Reject 
Perceived_Vulnerability_2 4.183 0.969 4.319 0.779 0.355 Not Reject 
Perceived_Vulnerability_3 3.930 1.117 3.819 0.962 0.525 Not Reject 
Response_efficacy_1 4.127 0.933 3.875 0.985 0.116 Not Reject 
Response_efficacy_2 4.535 0.766 4.472 0.707 0.609 Not Reject 
Response_efficacy_3 4.521 0.767 4.278 0.768 0.058 Not Reject 
Formal_sanctions_certainty_1 4.014 1.193 4.125 0.957 0.540 Not Reject 
Formal_sanctions_certainty_2 4.070 1.142 4.181 0.918 0.522 Not Reject 
Formal_sanctions_certainty_3 4.268 1.034 4.194 0.892 0.647 Not Reject 
Formal_sanctions_severity_1 4.366 1.065 4.236 0.874 0.425 Not Reject 
Formal_sanctions_severity_2 4.380 1.053 4.042 1.020 0.051 Not Reject 
Formal_sanctions_severity_3 4.296 1.093 4.000 0.943 0.083 Not Reject 
Informal_sanctions_certainty_1 4.113 1.082 3.903 1.069 0.243 Not Reject 
Informal_sanctions_certainty_2 4.155 1.109 4.181 1.058 0.886 Not Reject 
Informal_sanctions_certainty_3 4.268 1.006 4.181 0.976 0.600 Not Reject 
Informal_sanctions_severity_1 4.042 1.261 3.917 1.010 0.513 Not Reject 
Informal_sanctions_severity_2 4.268 1.174 4.000 1.080 0.156 Not Reject 
Informal_sanctions_severity_3 4.099 1.246 3.903 1.095 0.318 Not Reject 
 
Results of the Z test statistic indicated no p-value was less than 0.05 indicating there was 





 Path coefficient values and their corresponding statistical significance were used 
for hypotheses testing. These values would determine if a null hypothesis was rejected or 
not rejected. For the reader's convenience Table 22 and Table 23 repeat the presentation 
of the path coefficient values of the control and experimental groups, respectively. 
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Table 22  










(|O/STDEV|) p Values 
Significance 
(p < 0.05) 
Formal Sanction Certainty -> Behavioral Intention -0.22 -0.205 0.112 1.964 0.050 No 
Formal Sanction Severity -> Behavioral Intention 0.148 0.139 0.135 1.092 0.276 No 
Informal Sanction Certainty -> Behavioral Intention 0.063 0.065 0.162 0.392 0.695 No 
Informal Sanction Severity -> Behavioral Intention -0.012 0.002 0.123 0.100 0.920 No 
Perceived Severity -> Behavioral Intention 0.084 0.088 0.126 0.668 0.505 No 
Perceived Vulnerability -> Behavioral Intention 0.16 0.149 0.109 1.470 0.142 No 
Response efficacy -> Behavioral Intention 0.332 0.306 0.133 2.495 0.013 Yes 





Table 23  










(|O/STDEV|) p Values 
Significance 
(p < 0.05) 
Formal Sanction Certainty -> Behavioral Intention 0.066 0.061 0.158 0.416 0.678 No 
Formal Sanction Severity -> Behavioral Intention -0.353 -0.344 0.182 1.943 0.053 No 
Informal Sanction Certainty -> Behavioral Intention 0.248 0.207 0.203 1.222 0.222 No 
Informal Sanction Severity -> Behavioral Intention 0.124 0.152 0.198 0.629 0.53 No 
Perceived Severity -> Behavioral Intention 0.245 0.244 0.165 1.479 0.14 No 
Perceived Vulnerability -> Behavioral Intention 0.05 0.044 0.111 0.454 0.65 No 
Response efficacy -> Behavioral Intention 0.115 0.12 0.203 0.568 0.57 No 




Hypotheses analysis begins with the control group. 
RQ1–What is the effect of informal sanction certainty on individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H01: Informal sanction certainty will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha1: Informal sanction certainty will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Each of the constructs used a 5-point Likert scale for participant responses. The 
path coefficient for informal sanction certainty was -0.063 with a p-value of .392 
indicating the path coefficient was not significant. Because the path coefficient was not 
significant, Ha1 was rejected, and H01 was not rejected. This result indicated informal 
sanction certainty did not have an effect on an individual’s information security policy 
compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ2–What is the effect of informal sanction severity on an individual’s 
behavioral intention to comply with information security policies? 
H02: Informal sanction severity will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha2: Informal sanction severity will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
The path coefficient for informal sanction severity was -0.012 with a p-value of 
.920 indicating the path coefficient was not significant. Because the path coefficient was 
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not significant, Ha2 was rejected, and H02 was not rejected. This result indicated informal 
sanction severity did not have a positive effect on an individual’s information security 
policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ3–What is the effect of formal sanction certainty on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H03: Formal sanction certainty will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha3: Formal sanction certainty will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
The path coefficient for formal sanction certainty was -0.220 with a p-value of 
.050 indicating the path coefficient was not significant. Because the path coefficient was 
not significant, Ha3 was rejected, and H03 was not rejected. This result indicated formal 
sanction certainty did not have a positive effect on an individual’s information security 
policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ4–What is the effect of formal sanction severity on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H04: Formal sanction severity will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha4: Formal sanction severity will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
The path coefficient for formal sanction severity was 0.148 with a p-value of .276 
indicating the path coefficient was not significant. Because the path coefficient was not 
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significant, Ha4 was rejected, and H04 was not rejected. This result indicated formal 
sanction severity did not have a positive effect on an individual’s information security 
policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ5–What is the effect of perceived threat vulnerability on an individual’s 
behavioral intention to comply with information security policies? 
H05: Perceived threat vulnerability will have a nonpositive affect on an 
individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha5: Perceived threat vulnerability will have a statistically significant positive 
affect on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
The path coefficient for perceived threat vulnerability was 0.160 with a p-value of 
.142 indicating the path coefficient was not significant. Because the path coefficient was 
not significant, Ha5 was rejected, and H05 was not rejected. This result perceived threat 
vulnerability did not have a positive effect on an individual’s information security policy 
compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ6–What is the effect of perceived threat severity on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H06: Perceived threat severity will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha6: Perceived threat severity will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
The path coefficient for perceived threat severity was 0.084 with a p-value of .505 
indicating the path coefficient was not significant. Because the path coefficient was not 
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significant, Ha6 was rejected, and H06 was not rejected. This result indicated perceived 
threat severity did not have a positive effect on an individual’s information security 
policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ7–What is the effect of response efficacy on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H07: Response efficacy will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha7: Response efficacy will have a statistically significant positive affect on an 
individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
The path coefficient for response efficacy was 0.332 with a p-value of .013 
indicating the path coefficient was significant. Because the path coefficient was 
significant, Ha7 was not rejected, and H07 was rejected. This result indicated response 
efficacy did have a positive effect on an individual’s information security policy 
compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ8–What is the effect of self-efficacy on an individual’s behavioral intention to 
comply with information security policies? 
H08: Self-efficacy will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s information 
security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha8: Self-efficacy will have a statistically significant positive affect on an 
individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
The path coefficient for self-efficacy was 0.467 with a p-value of 0.000 indicating 
the path coefficient was significant. Because the path coefficient was significant, Ha8 was 
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not rejected, and H08 was rejected. This result indicated self-efficacy did have a positive 
effect on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Hypotheses analysis continues with the experimental group.  
RQ1–What is the effect of informal sanction certainty on individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H01: Informal sanction certainty will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha1: Informal sanction certainty will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
The path coefficient for informal sanction certainty was 0.248 with a p-value of 
.222 indicating the path coefficient was not significant. Because the path coefficient was 
not significant, Ha1 was rejected, and H01 was not rejected. This result indicated informal 
sanction certainty did not have an effect on an individual’s information security policy 
compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ2–What is the effect of informal sanction severity on an individual’s 
behavioral intention to comply with information security policies? 
H02: Informal sanction severity will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha 2: Informal sanction severity will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
The path coefficient for informal sanction severity was 0.124 with a p-value of 
.530 indicating the path coefficient was not significant. Because the path coefficient was 
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not significant, Ha2 was rejected, and H02 was not rejected. This result indicated informal 
sanction severity did not have an effect on an individual’s information security policy 
compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ3–What is the effect of formal sanction certainty on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H03: Formal sanction certainty will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha3: Formal sanction certainty will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
The path coefficient for formal sanction certainty was 0.660 with a p-value of 
0.678 indicating the path coefficient was not significant. Because the path coefficient was 
not significant, Ha3 was rejected, and H03 was not rejected. This result indicated formal 
sanction certainty did not have an effect on an individual’s information security policy 
compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ4–What is the effect of formal sanction severity on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H04: Formal sanction severity will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha4: Formal sanction severity will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
The path coefficient for formal sanction severity was -0.353 with a p-value of 
.053 indicating the path coefficient was not significant. Because the path coefficient was 
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not significant, Ha4 was rejected, and H04 was not rejected. This result indicated formal 
sanction severity did not have a positive effect on an individual’s information security 
policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ5–What is the effect of perceived threat vulnerability on an individual’s 
behavioral intention to comply with information security policies? 
H05: Perceived threat vulnerability will have a nonpositive affect on an 
individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha5: Perceived threat vulnerability will have a statistically significant positive 
affect on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
The path coefficient for perceived threat vulnerability was 0.050 with a p-value of 
.650 indicating the path coefficient was not significant. Because the path coefficient was 
not significant, Ha5 was rejected, and H05 was not rejected. This result perceived threat 
vulnerability did not have a positive effect on an individual’s information security policy 
compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ6–What is the effect of perceived threat severity on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H06: Perceived threat severity will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha6: Perceived threat severity will have a statistically significant positive affect 
on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
The path coefficient for perceived threat severity was 0.245 with a p-value of .140 
indicating the path coefficient was not significant. Because the path coefficient was not 
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significant, Ha6 was rejected, and H06 was not rejected. This result indicated perceived 
threat severity did not have a positive effect on an individual’s information security 
policy compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ7–What is the effect of response efficacy on an individual’s behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies? 
H07: Response efficacy will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s 
information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha7: Response efficacy will have a statistically significant positive affect on an 
individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
The path coefficient for response efficacy was 0.115 with a p-value of .570 
indicating the path coefficient was not significant. Because the path coefficient was not 
significant, Ha7 was rejected, and H07 was not rejected. This result indicated response 
efficacy did not have a positive effect on an individual’s information security policy 
compliance behavioral intention. 
RQ8–What is the effect of self-efficacy on an individual’s behavioral intention to 
comply with information security policies? 
H08: Self-efficacy will have a nonpositive affect on an individual’s information 
security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Ha8: Self-efficacy will have a statistically significant positive affect on an 
individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
The path coefficient for self-efficacy was 0.373 with a p-value of 0.010 indicating 
the path coefficient was significant. Because the path coefficient was significant, Ha8 was 
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not rejected, and H08 was rejected. This result indicated self-efficacy did have a positive 
effect on an individual’s information security policy compliance behavioral intention. 
Summary 
 Data collection began with the development of an online survey and distributed to 
SurveyMonkey audience participants. A suspension of the survey occurred because of 
excessive survey abandonment, and an insufficient number of completed responses were 
received. The survey was distributed to SurveyMonkey audience participants a second 
time to obtain additional responses. Data analysis started with descriptive statistics of the 
control and experimental groups’ demographics and responses. Survey responses were 
further analyzed using partial least squares-structural equation modeling. Results from 
this analysis provided information related to the quality of the measurement and 
structural models. Path coefficients calculated during the partial least squares-structural 
equation modeling process were used to test each research question and hypothesis. 
Hypotheses testing indicated the response efficacy and self-efficacy research questions in 
the control group and the self-efficacy research questions in the experimental group were 
statistically significant. Results of the hypotheses testing also indicated the remaining 
hypotheses were not statistically significant for both participant groups and not supported 
by the data.  
Chapter 5 includes a summary of the statistical results and interpretation of the 
findings. The interpretation also includes a discussion on the lack of statistically 
significant results for many of the variables. Following the interpretation of the findings 
is a discussion on study limitations, recommendations, and implications. Included in the 
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implication discussion is a description of the effect of this research on social change. 
Chapter 5 closes with the conclusions developed as a result of this study. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Interpretation of Findings 
Interpretation of the findings begins where the data analysis ended, examining the 
statistical differences between the two study groups. These statistical differences may 
provide a basis for understanding the finding of other areas of the study. Table 21 
presents a comparison of the construct response means. For all of the study constructs, 
there was no statistically significant difference between the responses from the control 
and experimental groups. One reason for this lack of statistically significant difference 
between the groups could be the fear appeal presented in the experimental treatment did 
not invoke a change in motivation to comply with an organization’s information security 
policies. Rogers (1975) noted a communication with a high level of fear appeal has a 
greater influence on motivation than a low level of fear appeal. Because there was no 
statistically significant difference between the group receiving the experimental treatment 
and the group that did not receive the experimental treatment, the fear appeal contained in 
the experimental treatment may not have aroused an emotion sufficient enough to 
influence an individual’s behavior. A similar outcome was identified by Boss et al. 
(2015) in a study incorporating a high and a low-level fear appeal. Boss et al. found that a 
high-level fear appeal had two times the influence on behavioral intention than a low-
level fear appeal. The Boss et al. high-level fear appeal model constructs all had a 
significant influence on behavioral intention. The high-level fear appeal significance 
contrasted with the Boss et al. low-level fear appeal model where some of the constructs 
did not have a significant influence on behavioral intention.  
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Another reason for the lack of construct response statistically significant 
difference could have been the selected population of information technology 
professionals. Construct responses from the control group indicated a high level of 
information security policy compliance. Many of the control group construct response 
averages were between four and five. Both groups had a high level of information 
security policy awareness, 95.8% for the control group and 93.1% for the experimental 
group. Given this high level of information security policy awareness, the fear appeal in 
the experimental treatment may not have been sufficient enough to increase information 
security policy behavioral intention for information technology professionals. The next 
step in the interpretation of the findings was examining the validity of the partial least 
squares-structural equation modeling model, starting with the measurement model. 
Determining measurement model validity includes examining the results from 
Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability, indicator reliability, average variance extracted, 
cross loadings, and Fornell-Larcker criteria calculations (Hair et al., 2017). Table 8 
presents the Cronbach’s alpha calculation results. All of the results, except one variable 
in one group, exceeded the 0.700 threshold. The value of the single exception was .695 
close enough to be considered acceptable. All of the composite reliability results 
presented in Table 9 exceeded the 0.700 threshold and are considered acceptable. Several 
of the composite reliability values exceeded the 0.950 threshold. All of the constructs are 
measuring the same thing and may not be a valid measure (Hair et al., 2017). Given the 
one item that was only slightly below the threshold and the remaining Cronbach’s alpha 
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and composite reliability values exceeded the recommended thresholds, demonstrating 
internal consistency of the model. 
Indicator reliability and average variance extracted value results are used to 
determine convergent validity. Indicator reliability, or outer loadings, results were 
presented in Table 10. Except for three outer loadings results, all of the outer loadings 
exceeded the recommended 0.708 threshold. Indicators with a value of 0.40 to 0.70 
should be considered for removal. Removal of an indicator should be done to ensure that 
there are no reductions in the composite reliability and average variances values (Hair et 
al., 2017). Removal of indicators to determine the effects of their removal was beyond 
the scope of this study. Table 11 presents the average variance extracted values. All of 
the values exceed the recommended 0.50 threshold. Except three of the outer loadings, all 
of the values exceeded their respective threshold and demonstrated convergent validity. 
Construct cross loadings and Fornell-Larcker criterion analyses are used to 
determine discriminant validity. A review of the cross loadings presented in Table 12 and 
Table 13 indicated that all but two cross loadings were greater than their corresponding 
variable cross loadings. This result demonstrates discriminant validity for a majority of 
the constructs. A second approach to determining discriminant validity is the Fornell-
Larcker criterion. When the indicator values are greater than the correlation with the 
remaining variables, discriminant validity is demonstrated (Hair et al., 2017). All control 
group Fornell-Larcker criterion presented in Table 14 and all experimental group Fornell-
Larcker criterion presented in Table 15 have indicator values that are greater than the 
remaining variable correlation values demonstrating discriminant validity. 
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Taking a holistic view of the measurement model validity analyses, with a few 
exceptions, internal consistency, convergent validity, and discriminant validity 
demonstrated model validity. The measurement model was validated by a majority of the 
analyses conducted. Several individual calculations were outside the acceptable range 
with some inconsistencies between the control and experimental groups and between 
tests. These inconsistencies offer an opportunity for investigation by future researchers. 
Following the interpretation of the measurement model is an interpretation of the results 
from the structural model analysis. 
Analysis of the structural model included calculating coefficients of 
determination, predictive relevance, size and significance of the path coefficients, and f 2 
and q2 effect sizes. Calculating the R2 determines the coefficient of determination value 
for the model. For this study, the R2 value for the control group was 0.752 and 0.540 for 
the experimental group. An R2 value of 0.20 is considered acceptable for behavioral 
studies (Hair et al., 2017). Johnston et al. (2015) examined the effect of a fear appeal 
using constructs from both protection motivation theory and deterrence theory. An R2 
value of 0.32 was the result of the calculation for the model examining compliance 
behavioral intention (Johnston et al., 2015). In another study using protection motivation 
theory, the model used by Johnston and Warkentin (2010) had an R2 value of 0.271. 
Siponen and Vance (2010) developed a model using deterrence theory and the model 
analysis produced an R2 value of 0.470. The R2 value of both the control and 
experimental groups exceeded the level recommended by Hair et al. and the other model 
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values found in the literature. Because the study R2 values exceeded these benchmark 
values, both the control and experimental groups R2 values are considered acceptable. 
The model Q2 values determine predictive relevance. Table 15 presents the 
construct crossvalidated redundancy report. The Q2 value for behavioral intention is 
0.562 for the control group and 0.351 for the experimental group. Values of Q2 greater 
than zero indicate the model’s predictive relevance is acceptable (Hair et al., 2017). 
Because both the control and experimental groups’ Q2 values exceed zero, the model’s 
predictive relevance is acceptable. Other studies examined for comparison of results did 
not report a Q2 value.  
Tables 16 and 17 presents the model path coefficients and their associated 
statistical significance. For the control group, the path coefficients for response efficacy 
and self-efficacy are statistically significant. For the experimental group, only the self-
efficacy path coefficient is statistically significant. Boss et al. (2015) had a similar result 
in a study examining a fear appeal. Two levels of fear appeal, high and low, were used as 
an experimental treatment to examine their effect on students. Results of the low fear 
appeal model analysis indicated nonsignificant path coefficients for most of the 
relationships. A similar situation could be occurring with this dissertation study. The fear 
appeal included in the experimental treatment could be considered low for the 
information technology population used in the study. A low fear appeal could have a 
small effect on the study population producing nonsignificant model path coefficients. 
Table 18 presents the model f 2effect sizes. Both response efficacy and self-
efficacy had a large effect size for the control group. For the experimental group, self-
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efficacy had a large effect size. In both cases, variables with large effect sizes matched 
the significant path coefficients of each model. No effect size calculation for q2 was 
possible because the individual variable Q2 values were not greater than zero. 
Although the model had an acceptable R2 value and predictive relevance, the path 
coefficient relevance and the effect sizes indicated the self-efficacy variable made a 
statistically significant contribution and the remaining seven variables did not make a 
statistically significant contribute to the model. Self-efficacy’s statistically significant 
contribution could be related to information technology professional confidence in 
complying with information security policies. A possible explanation for the 
nonstatistcally significant findings could be the fear appeal communication did not cause 
a change in the participants’ motivation because the effect of the fear appeal was low. An 
analysis of the intergroup responses indicated there was not a statistically significant 
difference between the groups’ responses. Information technology professionals could 
already possess a high level of information security policy awareness, and a low level 
fear appeal communication may not change an individual’s compliance intention. 
Limitations of the Study 
Study limitations described in Chapter 1 included relying on participants self-
reporting their responses, demographic accuracy, and possible bias introduced by the 
study population. Participants self-reported their responses to the survey and actual 
measure of behavioral attention were not included in the study. The survey did not 
request additional participant demographic information. SurveyMonkey provided all 
participant demographic information. Because the study population was information 
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technology professionals, this might introduce bias into the results. Information 
technology professionals could have a higher level of information security policy 
awareness. An analysis of the participant responses indicated there was not a statistically 
significant difference in the construct responses. A lack of statistically significant 
differences between the group responses could support the argument that information 
technology professionals could have a higher level of information security policy 
awareness. The introduction of this information security policy awareness bias is a 
limitation of the study. These results may not be generalizable to the general public 
because information technology professionals could possess a greater behavioral 
intention to comply with information security policies. Another limitation discovered 
during the study is the possible low-level fear appeal communication. A low level fear 
appeal would not provide sufficient motivation to change an individual’s behavior. 
Because a low-level fear appeal would not change an individual’s behavior, this could 
also account for the lack of statistically significant difference between the control and 
experimental groups’ construct responses. 
Recommendations 
Results of the measurement model and the structural model analysis indicated the 
model was acceptable. Participant construct response analysis indicated there was not a 
statistically significant difference between the groups. It is recommended future research 
include a different population to address this issue. Selecting a population that does not 
include information technology professionals may eliminate the possible bias introduced 
by this population. Because information technology professionals may possess a greater 
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level of information security policy compliance behavioral intention, excluding 
information technology professionals from the population may result in statistically 
significant differences between the group responses. The lack of a statistically significant 
difference between the study groups may also be related to using a low-level fear appeal. 
A recommendation to resolve this problem could be to develop a more strongly worded 
fear appeal communication. This type of fear appeal could provide a greater emotional 
response to motivate a change in behavior. It may be difficult to determine if a fear 
appeal communication is strong enough to get the required response. A recommendation 
to verify the effect of a fear appeal communication is to conduct one or more pilot 
studies. Pilot studies could help to develop a strong fear appeal communication. Another 
recommendation addresses the problems encountered during the data collection process.  
During the data collection process, SurveyMonkey identified some problems with 
the survey and survey process. A problem with the survey identified by SurveyMonkey 
support was the length of the consent form. SurveyMonkey provides survey construction 
guidelines, and one guideline is the length of the consent form. The SurveyMonkey 
guideline recommends a maximum of 250 characters for the consent form 
(SurveyMonkey Audience for Academics, 2016). The consent form used in the survey 
contained about 500 words. SurveyMonkey support recommended changing the consent 
form, but because the survey used an Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved consent 
form, the consent form was not modified. A recommendation to develop a smaller 
consent form for studies using the SurveyMonkey audience could mitigate this problem. 
A smaller consent form may reduce the number of abandoned surveys. If the 
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abandonment rate is excessive, SurveyMonkey will suspend the survey. Another issue 
identified by SurveyMonkey support was the applicability of using the SurveyMonkey 
audience for academic surveys. It is difficult to determine if the consent form length or 
the appropriateness of the SurveyMonkey audience contributed to the high survey 
abandonment rate. I anticipated SurveyMonkey audience members would be more 
receptive to completing surveys because they have volunteered to become survey 
recipients. A recommendation for future research is to not use SurveyMonkey audience 
participants for academic research. Selecting a group outside of the SurveyMonkey 
audience may be a better population for academic research. A change in the demographic 
information collection is also recommended to increase the level of data analysis. 
SurveyMonkey provides a limited amount of respondent demographic 
information. By requesting demographic information as part of the survey, obtaining 
additional detail information on the participants is possible. Age demographic 
information provided in the SurveyMonkey information was age ranges and not the 
participant’s age in years. By analyzing individual ages instead of age ranges may allow 
researchers greater insight to the respondents. 
The discussion included several recommendations for future researchers. These 
recommendations included changes to the study population, stronger fear appeal 
communication, and survey changes. A change in the population away from information 
technology professionals may reduce information security policy compliance bias. A 
strongly worded fear appeal communication may produce the emotion needed to change 
an individual’s behavior. If possible, modify the consent form to meet the SurveyMonkey 
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guidelines. Changing the survey participants to a population outside of the 
SurveyMonkey audience may improve the survey response rate. Adding additional 
demographic information requests to the survey may provide additional details about the 
participant. All of the recommendations suggested are intended to improve the research 
and data analysis of future studies. 
Implications  
An information technology professional’s noncompliance with information 
security policy could result in inadequate information security. Threats to the United 
States’ critical cyber infrastructure from cybercriminals are constantly increasing. By 
conducting this study, information could be added to the body of knowledge and assist 
with mitigating the problem of information security noncompliance. Information security 
policy compliance by information technology professionals is crucial to the security of 
electronic data. An examination of information security policy compliance behavioral 
intention could promote social change in information security and contribute to securing 
the country’s critical cyber infrastructure. 
A gap in the literature existed related to studies of information security policy 
compliance behavioral intention combining protection motivation theory and deterrence 
theory. This study provided a theoretical contribution by demonstrating the applicability 
of research models merging the constructs of protection motivation theory and deterrence 
theory to exam information security compliance behavioral intention. An experimental 
contribution made by the study is how important a fear appeal communication is to 
motivating behavioral change. As was demonstrated in the study, a low level fear appeal 
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communication will not produce the necessary behavioral change. Identifying the level of 
a fear appeal communication also has practical implications. 
Management using a fear appeal communication to motivate a change in 
information security policy compliance should ensure the communication produces the 
desired results. A low level fear appeal communication will have little to no effect on 
motivating an individual to change his or her behavior. This study has a practical 
implication for the development of an appropriate fear appeal communication. A 
methodology was presented for testing a fear appeal communication before 
implementation. Through the use of two groups, a fear appeal communication, and a 
survey, management can test the fear appeal communication appropriateness to verify the 
fear appeal results. There are also implications for future academic researchers.  
Some recommendations were made to assist future researchers. In addition to the 
theoretical contributions and practical implications, future researchers should incorporate 
some of the recommendations to improve their online survey technique. Creating a 
survey that complies with the online survey provider guidelines can improve the survey 
response rate. Determining the appropriateness of the population and survey respondents 
is important to a successful online survey data collection process. Learning more about 
the expectations of the survey participants may help in the design of an online survey. 
Improving information security is an important management objective. 
Conducting a study examining information security policy compliance behavioral 
intention has both theoretical and practical implications. Conducting this study made a 
contribution to the theoretical knowledge base. This study also provided a practical 
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methodology for developing information security policy compliance communications. 
Researchers also benefited from the study by learning from the recommendations to 
improve future research. 
Social Change Impact 
Vance et al. (2012) identified information security policy noncompliance as the 
cause for a majority of the information security breaches. Positive social change could be 
achieved by changing the information security behaviors of information technology 
professionals. Increasing the information security policy compliance behaviors of 
information technology professionals could result in improved information security and 
information asset protection. Improved information security policy compliance behavior 
could promote positive social change in information technology security and contribute 
to securing society’s critical information assets. 
Conclusions 
Encountering an unexpected outcome may provide a greater learning experience 
than an expected outcome. Building on the work of others is the foundation of academic 
research. The purpose of this quantitative experimental study was to examine a 
combination of protection motivation theory and deterrence theory constructs that relate 
to the information security policy behavioral intention of information technology 
professionals. A research model was developed to test the effect of a fear appeal 
communication on motivating a behavioral change. Testing of the research model 
indicated it was appropriate for the study, but achieved an unintended result. The data 
analysis indicated there was no change in behavior. Although this was not the expected 
168 
 
result, the result provided insight into the effect of the fear appeal communication. By not 
obtaining the desired result, more was learned about the topic. Sharing this information 
improved insight with the desire to increase the knowledge on information security policy 
compliance behavior. Future researchers can build on the knowledge to offer additional 
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Appendix A: Constructs, Statements and Questions 
 Protection Motivation Theory  
Constructs Item Source 
Behavioral intention 1 I intend to comply with information security 
polices 
Siponen, Mahmood, & 
Pahnila (2014) 
Behavioral intention 2 I intend to recommend others to 
comply with information security 
policies 
Siponen, Mahmood, & 
Pahnila (2014) 
Behavioral intention 3 I intend to assist others in complying with 
information security policies 
Siponen, Mahmood, & 
Pahnila (2014) 
Self-efficacy 1 I can comply with information security 
policies by myself 
Siponen, Mahmood, & 
Pahnila (2014) 
Self-efficacy 2 I can use information security measures 
if I can call for help if I get stuck 
Siponen, Mahmood, & 
Pahnila (2014) 
Self-efficacy 3 I can use information security measures 
if someone tells me what to do as I go 
along 
Siponen, Mahmood, & 
Pahnila (2014) 
Perceived Severity 1 An information security breach in my 
organization would be a serious problem for 
me 
Siponen, Mahmood, & 
Pahnila (2014) 
Perceived Severity 2 An information security breach in my 
organization would be a serious 
Siponen, Mahmood, & 
Pahnila (2014) 
Perceived Severity 3 Information security breaches are 
becoming more and more serious 




I could be subjected to a serious 
information security threat 




My organization could be subjected to a 
serious information security threat 




More and more serious information 
security threats are being faced by my 
organization 
Siponen, Mahmood, & 
Pahnila (2014) 
Response efficacy 1 The information security personnel in 
our organization keep information system 
security breaches down 
Siponen, Mahmood, & 
Pahnila (2014) 
Response efficacy 2 Complying with information security 
policies in our organization keep 
information system security breaches down 
Siponen, Mahmood, & 
Pahnila (2014) 
Response efficacy 3 Having information security policies in 
our organization keep information system 
security breaches down 
Siponen, Mahmood, & 
Pahnila (2014) 
From “Employees’ adherence to information security policies: An exploratory field 
study,” by M. Siponen, M. A. Mahmood, and S. Pahnila, 2014, Information & 





 Deterrence Theory  
Constructs Item Source 
Formal sanctions—
certainty 1 
What is the chance you would receive 
sanctions if you violated the company 
information security policy? 
Siponen & Vance (2010) 
Formal sanctions—
certainty 2 
What is the chance that you would be 
formally sanctioned if management learned 
that you had violated company information 
security policy? 
Siponen & Vance (2010) 
Formal sanctions—
certainty 3 
What is the chance that you would be 
formally reprimanded if management 
learned you had violated company 
information security policy? 
Siponen & Vance (2010) 
Formal sanctions—
severity 1 
How much of a problem would it be if you 
received severe sanctions if you violated the 
company information security policy? 
Siponen & Vance (2010) 
Formal sanctions—
severity 2 
How much of a problem would it create in 
your life if you were formally sanctioned 
for violating the company information 
security policy? 
Siponen & Vance (2010) 
Formal sanctions—
severity 3 
How much of a problem would it create in 
your life if you were formally reprimanded 
for violating the company information 
security policy? 
Siponen & Vance (2010) 
Informal sanctions—
certainty 1 
How likely is it that you would lose the 
respect and good opinion of your co-
workers for violating the company 
information security policy? 
Siponen & Vance (2010) 
Informal sanctions—
certainty 2 
How likely is it that you would jeopardize 
your promotion prospects if management 
learned that you had violated company 
information security policy? 
Siponen & Vance (2010) 
Informal sanctions—
certainty 3 
How likely is it that you would lose the 
respect and good opinion of your manager, 
if management learned that you had violated 
company IT security policies? 
Siponen & Vance (2010) 
Informal sanctions—
severity 1 
How much of a problem would it create in 
your life if you lost the respect and good 
opinion of your coworkers for violating the 
company information security policy? 
Siponen & Vance (2010) 
Informal sanctions—
severity 2 
How much of a problem would it create in 
your life if you jeopardized your future job 
promotion prospects for violating the 
company information security policy? 
Siponen & Vance (2010) 
Informal sanctions—
severity 3 
How much of a problem would it create in 
your life if you lost the respect of your 
manager for violating the company 
information security policy? 
Siponen & Vance (2010) 
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From “Neutralization: New insights into the problem of employee information systems 
security policy violations,” by M. Siponen and A. Vance, 2010, MIS Quarterly, 34(3), pp. 

















Appendix E: Fear Appeal Communication 
Information System Security Policy Communication 
To maintain the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of information resources, most 
organizations establish a written statement, often called information system security 
policy, information technology security policy, or other names. An information system 
security policy generally describes employees’ responsibilities for protecting corporate 
information from potential security incidents. Examples include employees’ 
responsibilities with regard to use of computers, e-mail communications, and 
Internet/network resources. 
 
From “Out of fear or desire? Toward a better understanding of employees’ motivation to 
follow IS security policies,” by J. Y. Son, 2011, Information & Management, 48(7), p. 
301. Copyright 2011 by Elsevier B.V. Used with permission. 
 
